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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the human rights
movement has been almost synonymous with the fight against impunity. Today, to support human rights means to favor criminal accountability for those individuals who have violated international
human rights or humanitarian law. It also means to be against amnesty laws that might preclude such accountability. This Article both
chronicles and critiques this turn to criminal law within human rights.
Human rights advocates have garnered significant success with
their relatively recent turn to criminal law. Judicial and quasi-judicial
human rights bodies, international and regional human rights institutions, and international human rights law scholars have largely concluded that states are responsible for criminally investigating,
prosecuting, and punishing individuals who commit war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide, as well as other “serious”
human rights violations. They further generally agree that a state’s
failure to fulfill such a duty constitutes a violation of international
human rights law and that, in certain instances, international criminal
institutions should be created or used to punish individual
perpetrators.
For the most part, scholars and advocates alike consider the ensuing increase in criminal trials for human rights violations—what
Kathryn Sikkink refers to as “the justice cascade”—as a positive turn
within the human rights movement.1 While Sikkink documents
human rights trials over the past three decades and recounts when
and how human rights prosecutions began and developed in Latin
America before spreading around the globe, no scholar—to my
knowledge—has systematically analyzed the extent to which judicial
and scholarly interpretation of both treaty-based and customary international law have changed over time to facilitate and justify the shift.
And few have considered the effects of that turn on the human rights
movement itself.
This Article aims to begin to fill both of those gaps. Rather than
charting the number or frequency of criminal prosecutions that have
taken place, it follows international human rights jurisprudence and
scholarly pronouncements on the state of international law to show
how criminal prosecutions have come to be seen as legally required.
As such, it situates contemporary international criminal legal institutions and the broad rejection of amnesty laws by regional and international human rights courts and institutions in some of the
international human rights law that predated them. And it connects
1
KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 5 (2011).
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these legal responses to the human rights movement’s explicit fight
against impunity, particularly against the “culture of impunity,” which
only began in the early-1990s.2 It was then that much human rights
advocacy started to move from naming, shaming, and sometimes judicially trying states for their violations of human rights to finding ways
to hold individuals criminally responsible for them.
In this Article I question the often unsupported or even unstated
assumption that the turn to criminal prosecution is a clear success for
the human rights movement by suggesting some of the disabling effects of that focus. I do not simply consider what has been missed by
the turn but attempt to demonstrate that, as criminal law has become
the enforcement tool of choice, it has negatively affected the lens
through which the human rights movement and the international law
scholars who support it view human rights violations. In short, as advocates increasingly turn to international criminal law to respond to
issues ranging from economic injustice to genocide, they reinforce an
individualized and decontextualized understanding of the harms they
aim to address, even while relying on the state and on forms of
criminalization of which they have long been critical.
Relatedly, I aim to demonstrate that the turn to criminal law was
not an obvious trajectory for either the human rights movement or
international law. I revisit the “truth versus justice” and “peace versus
justice” debates from the late-1980s through the mid-1990s, in which
human rights activists and international legal scholars actively disagreed over whether justice (meaning criminal justice) should take
priority over truth and peace, primarily in the context of transitional
regimes. I trace how those debates were mediated over time and attempt to revive the positions that “lost” and have largely been forgotten, even though the debates occurred during the professional lives of
many who remain influential in the human rights movement.
The contemporary embrace of criminal law—along with the
equation of criminal prosecutions, justice, and human rights—has
taken place with little systematic deliberation about the aims of criminal law or about its pitfalls. In fact, forgotten are not only the debates
about justice versus peace and truth but also broader critiques of penal systems that have long been voiced by human rights advocates. I
am interested in how anti-impunity and its alignment with criminal
prosecutions came to be uncontested within human rights so relatively quickly and the effect that the current, increasingly rigidified,
position has on possibilities for legal interpretation as well as for internal critique within the human rights movement.

2

See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Throughout the Article, I use Amnesty International (AI), one of
the oldest and most significant of the international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) on human rights, to illustrate the shift I see
from the 1970s to today within human rights advocacy. Although,
given its name, it almost seems too obvious to mention, amnesty was
central to the organization’s mission when it was founded in the early1960s to organize letter-writing campaigns calling for the release of
political prisoners, or those whom it adopted as “prisoners of conscience.” By the early-1970s, AI had begun to work more broadly on
issues of prison conditions and due process for all prisoners. Yet,
since the 1990s, AI has been one of the most vocal opponents of
amnesties, now for perpetrators of human rights violations rather
than prisoners of conscience. It also, if somewhat reluctantly at first,
has become a strong supporter of international criminal institutions.
I use AI as my primary example, in part to show that the term
“amnesty” has only relatively recently been perceived as a negative
term in human rights.3 I also believe that AI’s current positions on
impunity and amnesty are representative of the views of other large
international human rights NGOs, as well as of many domestic human
rights NGOs. I occasionally refer to other such organizations but concentrate on AI as a way to study how the shift operates within one
organization.
I pursue these arguments and aims as follows. Part I of the Article provides a brief overview of the trend in human rights that I identify, locating the human rights movement’s shift, in part, within postCold War neoliberalism. Part II situates the criminal law turn in the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACHR), and shows how the court’s decision to hold states accountable for the action of nonstate actors (at the urging of advocates) provided an important precursor to the criminal turn. It then considers
jurisprudence on amnesty, primarily though not exclusively in the
IACHR, and contrasts it with the South African Constitutional Court’s
early decision on the issue. It does so to trace the truth, justice, and
peace debates throughout the period. Part III studies the development of international criminal institutions and how their
prosecutorial goals have both influenced and largely been adopted by
the human rights movement. Part IV returns to the human rights
movement and contends that the movement’s focus on criminalization has narrowed and distorted its view both of human rights harms
and of possible remedies for them.
3
As recent debates over immigration reform in the United States demonstrate, “amnesty” has come to have negative connotations in other arenas as well. See Linda S.
Bosniak, Amnesty in Immigration: Forgetting, Forgiving, Freedom, 16 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. &
POL. PHIL. 352–53 (2013).
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I
ANTI-IMPUNITY TREND

From the mid-1970s through the late 1980s, the human rights
movement—at least as represented by large international NGOs based
in Europe and the United States—primarily concerned itself with the
protection of individual civil and political rights.4 These NGOs mostly
used naming and shaming tactics to put pressure on states to end
their direct violations of human rights. They did not generally call on
states to prosecute individuals who committed the violations, in large
part because states—not individuals—were considered the
perpetrators.
Moreover, during this period, much human rights advocacy was
directed at states’ criminalization of political activity and at abuses of
their penal systems. When AI first began its letter-writing campaigns
in 1961, it called for the release of those it deemed prisoners of conscience. It did so by invoking the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) Article 18 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) and Article 19 (freedom of opinion and expression).5 As early as
1964, however, it began scrutinizing the criminal justice system’s treatment of all political prisoners, even if it did not adopt, nor call for the
release of, those who advocated force.6 By 1968, it officially expanded
its mandate to express concern for the treatment of all prisoners—
political and “ordinary”—using Article 5 (prohibiting torture and
4
I understand this geographical caveat is a big one. But given that much of the push
for criminal responses to human rights violations today also comes from some of these
same organizations and from human rights funders in the global north more generally, I
believe it is an appropriate trend to consider. By beginning with the 1970s, I essentially
follow Samuel Moyn’s history of the origins of the contemporary human rights movement.
See generally SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).
5
See WENDY H. WONG, INTERNAL AFFAIRS: HOW THE STRUCTURE OF NGOS TRANSFORMS
HUMAN RIGHTS 208 n.4 (2012); The Forgotten Prisoners by Peter Benenson, AMNESTY INT’L USA,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/about-us/amnesty-50-years/peter-benenson-remembered/
the-forgotten-prisoners-by-peter-benenson (last visited May 15, 2015) (reproducing the
1961 Observer article which marked the start of AI’s campaigns), see generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/910 (Dec. 10, 1948).
6
Amnesty Int’l, Annual Report, June 1, 1964 - May 31, 1965, at 7, AI Index POL 10/
001/1965 (May 31, 1965), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL10/
001/1965/en. After much internal debate surrounding Nelson Mandela, whom AI had
earlier adopted as a “forgotten prisoner,” AI decided that while it would advocate for fair
and prompt trials for all political prisoners, it would only campaign for the unconditional
release of those who had not advocated violence. Id. at 3, 7; see also NELSON MANDELA,
LONG WALK TO FREEDOM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NELSON MANDELA 612 (1995) (“The
award [Nobel Peace Prize] was a tribute to all South Africans and especially to those who
had fought in the struggle; I would accept the award on their behalf. But the Nobel award
was one I never thought about. Even during the bleakest years on Robben Island, Amnesty
International would not campaign for us on the grounds that we had pursued an armed
struggle, and their organization would not represent anyone who had embraced violence.
It was for that reason that I assumed the Nobel committee would never consider the man
who had started Umkhonto we Sizwe for the peace prize.”).
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cruel and inhumane punishment) and Article 9 (prohibiting arbitrary
arrest and detention) of the UDHR.7 Opposition to the death penalty
became part of its mandate in the early-1970s.8 While AI might have
found some states’ criminal justice systems more suspect than others,
it saw all countries as capable of abusing their penal power.9
Even as international and regional human rights institutions, including adjudicatory and quasi-adjudicatory bodies, emerged or expanded during the 1970s and 1980s with the aim of enforcing human
rights law beyond naming and shaming, they did so to review or judge
the human rights records of states. No international criminal courts
or tribunals existed to try individual perpetrators. Enthusiasm for an
international criminal court to try crimes ranging from war crimes to
terrorism had waxed and waned among international lawyers since
before the advent of the human rights movement, even as far back as
the interwar period.10 It did not gain significant momentum, however, until the mid-1990s. (See Figure 1, indicating the extent to
which such a court was discussed in books during these years, with a
sharp and steady increase beginning in the mid-early 1990s.)
As recently as 1991, the establishment of international criminal
courts to try individual perpetrators seemed implausible to many
human rights advocates as did large-scale domestic criminal
adjudication. As Argentine legal theorist Carlos Nino put it in his article in the Yale Law Journal that year, after suggesting that an
7

WONG, supra note 5.
Id.; see also Amnesty Int’l, Annual Report, 1969–1970, at 1, AI Index POL 10/001/
1970 (Jan. 1, 1970), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL10/001/
1970/en (adding, for the first time, Articles 5 and 9 of the UDHR to its list of “objects”
included in the introduction of its Annual Report). In 1970, AI engaged in a campaign to
secure the application of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners (SMRTP), thus evidencing growing concern with the treatment of prisoners in
custody. See Amnesty Int’l, supra at 2. In 1972, it launched the campaign against torture.
See Amnesty Int’l, Report on Torture, at 1, AI Index ACT 40/001/1973 (Jan. 1, 1973).
9
For example, Amnesty International’s 1973 Report on Torture, which discusses the
use of torture in criminal justice systems, states: “torture, now used not only for extracting
information but as a method of political control, is a world-wide phenomenon which is on
the increase.” Amnesty Int’l, Report on Torture, supra note 8, at 1.
10
When in 1944, Hans Kelsen called for an international criminal court to try war
criminals, he offered as support the work of Hugh H. L. Bellot, who first suggested the
establishment of such a court in a paper to the Grotius Society in 1916 and authored the
International Law Association’s draft statute for the “International Penal Court” in 1926.
See HANS KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 112–13 (2007) (1944) (citing Hugh H. L. Bellot, A
Permanent International Criminal Court, in INT’L LAW ASS’N, 1 REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIRST
CONFERENCE HELD AT THE PALACE OF JUSTICE, BUENOS AIRES, 24TH AUGUST-30TH AUGUST
1922, at 63 (1923)).
For discussion of various draft statutes and codes of crime that were produced in the
post-World War II era, between the 1950s and 1970s, and the effect of the Cold War on the
establishment of international criminal jurisdiction, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Making of
the International Criminal Court, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 117–22 (2008) [hereinafter Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME III].

R
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international criminal forum would be preferable to a requirement
that transitional states engage in domestic prosecutions: “[I]t may be
idealistic to hope for the establishment of [international criminal]
courts in the present state of international law; but it is no less realistic
than to hope that the international community, through external political pressure, will enforce the duty to prosecute past human rights
abuses.”11 Of course, we now know that neither was as far out of reach
as Nino expected.
FIGURE 1. N-GRAM: REFERENCES TO “INTERNATIONAL
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According to M. Cherif Bassiouni, the tide had begun to turn in
1989 when, in response to a United Nations special session on drug
trafficking, the United Nations General Assembly asked the International Law Commission (ILC) to prepare a study on the establishment
of an international criminal court to prosecute drug traffickers.13 The
ILC responded with a report that addressed a number of international
crimes other than drug trafficking.14 The report was favorably received by the General Assembly and eventually resulted in the ILC’s
1994 draft statute for an International Criminal Court.15 Bassiouni
notes that, although an international criminal court still seemed a distant possibility up until 1992, events in the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda generated broad-based support for international prosecutions of war crimes, which was manifested in the United Nations Security Council resolutions establishing the ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994.16 That support paved
11
Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The
Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2638–39 (1991).
12
An N-gram based on eight million of the titles digitized in Google books
demonstrates a sharp and steady increase in references to “international criminal court”
from around 1991. See generally Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., Quantitative Analysis of Culture
Using Millions of Digitized Books, 331 SCIENCE 176, 176–82 (2011).
13
Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME III, supra note 10, at 122.
14
Id. at 123.
15
Id. at 123–24.
16
Id. at 125.
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the way for the 1998 Rome Conference that adopted the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC).17 The focus of the ad
hoc tribunals on war crimes also caused a shift in terms of the scope of
the ICC. In the end, it was given no jurisdiction over drug trafficking.
Rather, it covers genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
the crime of aggression.18
That the Security Council was able to agree on the establishment
of international criminal tribunals with regard to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was also, of course, largely due to the end of the Cold
War and reflected the end of the stalemate that the Security Council
had faced for decades between its five permanent members. To be
sure, an international criminal response first functioned as a compromise in the former Yugoslavia when states were still unable to agree on
military intervention. And in Rwanda, international criminalization
was largely seen as a necessary response to an unfortunate problem
that the United Nations should have averted to begin with. Nevertheless, the Security Council’s choice of international criminal tribunals
in the early-1990s corresponded with a move to criminal law in other
areas as well, including in the battle against narco-trafficking that provided the impetus for the General Assembly’s request in 1989.
Moreover, the rise of neoliberalism that accompanied the end of
the Cold War often called for a strong punitive state, even while relaxing government control in many other areas.19 Criminal law
played an important role in economic restructuring and rule of law
projects throughout the world. Allegra McLeod explores in detail the
United States’ increased exportation of its own criminal justice model
throughout the 1990s to combat transnational crime.20 Noting that
then-Senator Kerry “repeatedly declared that transnational crime was
‘the new communism, the new monolithic threat’ ” and that it was up
17

Id. at 122–32.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3. Article 5(2) conditions the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression on
future amendment to the statute. Achieving such change has proved contentious. In
2010, States Parties agreed on language for several related amendments, but made their
enactment dependent upon ratification by thirty states and further decision by States Parties after January 1, 2017. For discussion of the amendments and the continuing uncertainties and ambiguities concerning the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, see
generally Sean D. Murphy, The Crime of Aggression at the ICC, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marc Weller & Alexia Solomou eds., 2015).
19
For discussion of the neoliberal turn within the United States, see generally
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007). For discussion of the
emergence of the penal state in Latin America, see generally Markus-Michael Müller, The
Rise of the Penal State in Latin America, 15 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 57 (2012).
20
Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83
(2010).
18
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to the United States to lead the crusade against it,21 she contends that
“[b]attling transnational crime became a vehicle to organize U.S.
global engagement in the post-Cold War period.”22 The exported
model favored retributive justice, and its spread corresponded to the
rise of prison rates in the United States.
In the early 1990s, the focus and approach of the human rights
movement also began to change in ways that coincided with, and perhaps fueled, the increased attention to and faith in criminal justice
systems—domestic, international, and transnational. During that
time, human rights advocates began to see the threat of impunity in
much the way then-Senator Kerry understood the threat of transnational crime.
AI’s 1991 “policy statement on impunity” is exemplary of the
term’s usage:
Amnesty International believes that the phenomenon of impunity is
one of the main contributing factors to [“persistent patterns of
gross human rights violations’ that ‘are still occurring in many countries throughout the world.”] Impunity, literally the exemption
from punishment, has serious implications for the proper administration of justice . . . . International standards clearly require states
to undertake proper investigations into human rights violations and
to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.23

Note that in this quotation, impunity is not simply a failure to remedy
human rights violations; it is a unique cause of them. AI repeated this
language in numerous country reports during this period.24 Such impunity, of course, might occur from a state’s passive failure to investigate human rights violations; or it might result from explicit decisions
not to prosecute abuses of human rights, such as through amnesty
laws. Advocates began to oppose both, increasingly decrying the
21

Id. at 104–05.
Id. at 104. McLeod details how the three primary modes of export—the Office of
Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training, the International Law Enforcement Academies, and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program—have been largely influenced both by Cold War counterinsurgency and drug
war training and by the American legal academy’s “Law and Development Movement.” Id.
at 96–102.
23
Amnesty Int’l, Policy Statement on Impunity, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 219 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
24
See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Chile: Members of Security Forces Charged in Connection with “Disappearance” of Mapuche Indians in 1974, at 2, AI Index AMR 22/02/92 (Feb. 1, 1992), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR22/002/1992/en; Amnesty Int’l,
Colombia: A Further Exchange of Views with the Colombian Government, at 13–14, AI Index AMR
23/69/91 (Dec. 1, 1991), available at http://amnesty.org/fr/library/info/AMR23/069/
1991/en [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l, Colombia]; Amnesty Int’l, El Salvador: Observations and
Recommendations Regarding the Commission of Truth, at 11, AI Index AMR 29/006/1992 (May
31, 1992), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR29/006/1992/en.
22
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“culture of impunity,” a term that had rarely been used before 1991.
(See Figure 2).
FIGURE 2. N-GRAM: REFERENCES TO “CULTURE OF IMPUNITY”
“INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT” (1970–2008)25
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Seeing impunity as cultural suggests deeply entrenched attitudes
that can only be changed over time. While one could imagine multiple ways to respond to that culture,26 the stage was being set for individual criminal responsibility to emerge as the primary and even
legally necessary response to it. Criminalization appealed to human
rights advocates working on a variety of different issues. Many women’s human rights proponents, for example, supported what
Elizabeth Bernstein labels “carceral feminism,” particularly in their attempts to address sex trafficking and sexual violence.27
In the next two Parts I consider some of the ways in which individual criminal responsibility became central to the human rights effort.
Domestic and international human rights NGOs as well as regional
and international institutions, including human rights courts, eventually concluded that the protection of international human rights and
25
This N-gram demonstrates a steady and significant increase in usage of the term
“culture of impunity” between 1991 and 2008. The line roughly mirrors that of references
to the International Criminal Court during the same period. See generally Michel et al.,
supra note 12. It also roughly coincides with the rise in actual international, domestic, and
foreign human rights prosecutions. See SIKKINK, supra note 1, at 138 fig.5.1.
26
Even AI, despite its strong position against impunity, stated in many of its reports in
the early 1990s that it took “no position on the granting of official amnesties or pardons
once the truth about the individual abuses has been brought to light through investigations and those responsible have been convicted.” See Amnesty Int’l, Colombia, supra note
24, at 13.
27
Elizabeth Bernstein, Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The Politics
of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns, 36 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 47 (2010). For a discussion of the history of the turn to criminal law in the
United States feminist movement during the same period, particularly among those she
identifies as dominance feminists, see Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 741 (2007); Aya Gruber, A “Neo-Feminist” Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law
Reform, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 583 (2012).

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-5\CRN502.txt

unknown

Seq: 11

22-JUN-15

2015] ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE TURN TO CRIMINAL LAW

15:19

1079

humanitarian law (which increasingly overlapped) required criminal
accountability at both domestic and international levels.
II
DOMESTIC PUNISHMENT AS INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS REMEDY
When we think of international criminal law, we generally have in
mind international criminal institutions. As I discuss in Part III, one
of the aims of the ICC is to put pressure on states to prosecute individuals domestically.28 In this Part, I consider how international human
rights law also attempts to affect domestic criminal prosecutions. That
is, although it has received relatively little attention, since the
late-1980s (several years before the ICC seemed likely), much human
rights law has aimed to pressure states to respond criminally to human
rights violations through what Alexandra Huneeus has recently
termed “the quasi-criminal jurisdiction of the human rights courts,” or
“international criminal law by other means.”29
I concentrate here on the development of the jurisprudence of
the IACHR, in particular on when, why, and how it has held states
accountable for the criminal investigation, prosecution, and punishment of human rights violations, including by invalidating amnesty
laws. I aim to show that, if inadvertently, the IACHR’s early case law
set the stage for the human rights movement’s anti-impunity emphasis, normalizing the turn to criminal law both inside and outside of
the Inter-American system. Its influence can be seen, for example, in
both the European and African human rights regimes, as well as in
the United Nations. I also aim to demonstrate how, along the way, the
IACHR’s jurisprudence and the human rights advocacy it both followed and spurred crafted decisions and arguments to make the conclusions seem less contested than they were. To consider the extent
to which there were differing opinions on the importance of impunity
and the meaning of impunity and justice, I also discuss in some detail
a 1996 South African Constitutional Court decision that has escaped
significant direct criticism, even though it reached a result quite different from that of the IACHR.
28

See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
Alexandra Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal
Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–3 (2013); see also Frédéric
Mégret & Jean-Paul S. Calderón, The Move Towards a Victim-Centric Concept of the Criminal
Law and the “Criminalization” of Inter-American Human Rights Law: A Case of Human Rights
Law Devouring Itself?, in 35 YEARS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY
AND PRACTICE, PRESENT AND FUTURE (Yves Haeck, Clara Burbano Herrera, & Oswaldo Ruiz
Chiriboga, eds., forthcoming 2015).
29
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A. Breakdown of the Public/Private Distinction
In recent years, the IACHR has struck down amnesty provisions in
many different countries,30 and it is there that its anti-impunity stance
is most clear. Yet, the roots of that line of cases extend to the court’s
earliest jurisprudence, which is known for its progressive move to
break down the public/private or state action/inaction divide. In this
subpart, I consider that early case law, reading it in particular for how
it set the stage for the court’s jurisprudence on amnesty.
In 1988, the IACHR handed down Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v. Honduras,
its first decision in a contentious case.31 In that case, the Honduran
government denied responsibility for the disappearance of a political
activist, although it put forward little by way of defense. Rather than
requiring that the applicant prove direct state action, the court found
that state accountability did not rest on only direct state involvement.32 Indeed,
[a]n illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not
directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a
private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the
Convention.33

According to the court, the state therefore possessed “a legal duty to
take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use
the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations . . . to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.”34
At the time, human rights advocates and legal scholars heralded
the decision as a defining moment for human rights law. Theodor
Meron, for example, in a lecture on state responsibility shortly after
the decision was rendered, read it as a response to the difficulty of
attribution in human rights law:
If we want international human rights law to become an authentic
branch of international law, equal to all other branches of international law, we must create a conceptual structure in which we can
invoke the same principles of state responsibility as in other fields of
30

See infra Part II.B.2.
Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4 (July 29,1988).
32
Id. ¶ 172.
33
Id.
34
Id. ¶ 174.
31
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international law. The basic requirement here is that we should be
able to invoke the same principles of attribution.35

Dinah Shelton, who would later become a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the body tasked with bringing and
arguing cases before the court, wrote an article shortly after
Velásquez-Rodrı́guez and two subsequent decisions.36 There, she commented that, because of the court’s willingness to interpret the American Convention on Human Rights to attribute state responsibility to
state inaction, “the American Convention provides guarantees for individual rights that are lacking in U.S. constitutional law.”37 And, in a
1993 report, AI referred to the judgment as “the most far-reaching
pronouncement to date of the principle of state responsibility.”38
When the women’s human rights movement began to take off in
the late-1980s and early-1990s, largely with a focus on violence against
women in the so-called private sphere, it saw Velásquez-Rodrı́guez as signaling a paradigmatic shift. In particular, a number of scholarly articles at the time cited the case as pathbreaking for the women’s human
rights movement’s attempts to break down the public/private distinction in international law.39 To this day, the case and its progeny are
cited by those who argue for state responsibility for violence against
women.40
Given that I identify Velásquez-Rodrı́guez as a significant precursor
to the turn to criminal law, it is important to point out that, despite its
35
Theodor Meron, State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 83 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 372, 377 (1989).
36
See Dinah Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibility of States, 13
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (1989). The other two contentious cases to which she refers are
Godinez Cruz and Fairen Garbi & Solis Corrales. Godı́nez-Cruz v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5 (Jan. 29, 1989); Fairén-Garbi & Solı́s-Corrales v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 6 (Mar. 15, 1989).
37
Shelton, supra note 36, at 3.
38
Amnesty Int’l, “Disappearances” and Political killings: Human Rights Crisis of the
1990s—A Manual for Action: Chapter G-5: Bringing the Perpetrators to Justice, Part 6, AI Index
ACT 33/60/93 (Oct. 1993), available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/
188000/act330601993en.pdf.
39
See, e.g., Andrew Byrnes, Women, Feminism, and International Human Rights Law—
Methodological Myopia, Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginalisation?, 12 AUST. YBIL 205,
229 (1988–89) (discussing the IACHR’s recognition of the obligation of states to prevent
or provide a remedy for violations of rights by private individuals); Margareth Etienne,
Addressing Gender-Based Violence in an International Context, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 139, 157
n.97 (1995) (citing the case as “sufficient precedent” for holding states liable for failing to
protect against human rights violations perpetrated by private individuals); Elizabeth K.
Spahn, Waiting for Credentials: Feminist Theories of Enforcement of International Human Rights,
44 AM. U. L. REV. 1053, 1064 n.34 (1995) (citing the case in discussion of making human
rights enforceable for both state and nonstate actions).
40
See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Rashida Manjoo, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/
RegularSession/Session23/A_HRC_23_49_English.pdf.
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announcement of the state’s obligation to punish, the court explicitly
distinguished itself from a criminal tribunal.41 The decision
explained:
The international protection of human rights should not be confused with criminal justice. States do not appear before the Court as
defendants in a criminal action. The objective of international
human rights law is not to punish those individuals who are guilty of
violations, but rather to protect the victims and to provide for the
reparation of damages resulting from the acts of the States
responsible.42

Somewhat paradoxically, the court asserted this distinction to lower
the commission’s burden of proof.43 Because the Honduran government failed to provide evidence in support of a defense on the merits,
the court accepted as true the commission’s rendition of the facts, a
move it acknowledged would be unlikely to satisfy the requirements of
a criminal prosecution.44
Perhaps because it had in mind a clear distinction between itself
and a criminal court and because it had little faith in the Honduran
government to investigate the case, the IACHR did not order the state
to engage in criminal prosecution. Instead, it ordered Honduras “to
pay fair compensation” to the victim’s next of kin.45 In cases beginning in the mid-1990s, however, including in some countries where
there was little reason to trust the police and prosecutors to engage in
fair investigation, prosecution, and punishment, the court began affirmatively to require that states initiate criminal investigations against
individual perpetrators.46 And, as Huneeus shows in great detail, over
time it has become increasingly common for human rights adjudicatory and quasi-adjudicatory bodies to order, or at least exhort, states to
engage in criminal proceedings at the remedial stage.47 She especially
41
Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4, ¶ 134 (July 29, 1988).
42
Id.
43
Id. ¶¶ 135–38.
44
Id.
45
Id. ¶ 194(5).
46
See, e.g., Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 42, ¶ 192(6) (Nov. 27, 1998) (unanimously ordering Peru to “investigate
the facts in the . . . Case, identify and punish those responsible for those acts, and adopt all
necessary domestic legal measures to ensure that this obligation is discharged”);
Paniagua-Morales et al. v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 37,
¶ 181(6) (Mar. 8, 1998) (unanimously ruling that Guatemala “must conduct a genuine and
effective investigation to determine the persons responsible for the human rights violations
referred to in this Judgment and, where appropriate, punish them”); Caballero-Delgado
and Santana v. Colombia, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 22, ¶ 72(5)
(Dec. 8, 1995) (unanimously deciding “that the Republic of Colombia is obligated to continue judicial proceedings into the disappearance and presumed death of the persons
named and to extend punishment in accordance with internal law”).
47
Huneeus, supra note 29, at 2.
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finds that trend in the IACHR, which, as of the time of her study, had
ordered the state to conduct a criminal investigation in over fifty contentious cases across fifteen states.48 Following such orders, states had
handed down nearly forty convictions in fifteen separate cases.49
Of course, the piercing of the public/private or state action/inaction divide did not necessarily require a criminalization approach.
One could hold the state accountable without ordering it to prosecute
individuals. Indeed, as I have already suggested, this turn to criminal
law was a somewhat curious move in the context of a human rights
movement that had, up until that point, largely focused on the punitive state as part of the problem.
While the IACHR’s early jurisprudence played a formative role in
the turn to criminal law, it was also part of a larger trend. The 1993
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, for example, “call[ed]
upon all States to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other measures to prevent, terminate and punish acts of enforced disappearance.”50 And invoking the need to oppose impunity for human
rights violations beyond enforced disappearances, seemingly with
amnesties in mind, the document continued: “States should abrogate
legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grave violations of human rights such as torture and prosecute such violations,
thereby providing a firm basis for the rule of law.”51 When
then-United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay delivered her opening comments to the Human Rights Council in
48

Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 15–17. Huneeus does note a contrast between the IACHR and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), describing the latter as more “deferential” to states in
that “it views its rulings as ‘declaratory’ and typically demands financial compensation of
the victim, but allows states to choose the means of bringing their practices into compliance with the European Convention.” Id. at 24. Although the European Court does not
supervise its own rulings, Huneeus contends that the Council of Europe nevertheless engages in “quasi-criminal review,” particularly via the Committee of Ministers, which has
responsibility for supervising the implementation of the ECHR’s decisions. For example,
in cases against Russia for forced disappearances and other war crimes that took place
during the Chechnya conflict from 1999 to 2003, the Committee of Ministers, “has declared that successful prosecution of individual cases is prerequisite to a finding that Russia
has complied with its obligation to ensure effective remedies pursuant to the ECHR’s rulings.” Id. Additionally, Huneeus points to decisions on individual complaints by the
United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Committee Against Torture, which she
contends also suggest quasi-criminal review. Id. at 26–27.
50
World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration], available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39ec.html. Further, “[t]he
World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms that it is the duty of all States, under any
circumstances, to make investigations whenever there is reason to believe that an enforced
disappearance has taken place on a territory under their jurisdiction and, if allegations are
confirmed, to prosecute its perpetrators.” Id. The document also called for criminalization at an international level. See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
51
Vienna Declaration, supra note 50, ¶ 60.
49
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February 2013, she reflected on the twenty years since the Vienna Declaration, highlighting three of its accomplishments.52 One was “its impact on the fight against impunity.”53
The issue had also been on the mind of the United Nations
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities since at least 1991, when it requested that Louis Joinet undertake a study on the impunity of perpetrators of civil and political
human rights violations.54 The final report, issued in 1997 and often
referred to as the Joinet Report, stated that countries have an obligation “to investigate violations, to prosecute the perpetrators, and, if
their guilt is established, to punish them.”55 Further, it concluded
that “[a]mnesty cannot be accorded to perpetrators before the victims
have obtained justice by means of an effective remedy.”56 As we see in
the following section, that connection between the obligation to punish and the prohibition on amnesty was soon to be made by the
IACHR.
B. Invalidation of Amnesty Laws
Today, few human rights NGOs, courts, or scholars defend the
legality of amnesties, at least those amnesties that do not exclude, at a
minimum, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and “serious” violations of human rights. Yet, many of these same groups, institutions, and even scholars tolerated, and sometimes even endorsed,
certain types of amnesties not that long ago. Argentine human rights
scholar and advocate Juan Méndez, for example, had long opposed
amnesties in Latin America. In 2000, as a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, he successfully argued before the
IACHR that Peru’s amnesty law violated the American Convention on
Human Rights.57 That same year, however, he acknowledged that the
amnesty process employed by transitional South Africa in the
52
See Navi Pillay, Opening Statement by Ms. Navi Pillay United Nations High
Comm’n for Human Rights at the 22nd Session of the Human Rights Council (Feb. 25,
2013), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13031&
LangID=E.
53
Id. The other two accomplishments were “its role in advancing women’s rights”
and “its swiftly realized recommendation to create the [High Commission].” Id.
54
See U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights
Violations (Civil and Political), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20 (June 26, 1997),
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1a124.html.
55
Id. ¶ 27. The report also sees itself as a follow-up to Vienna, stating that it “comes
under the general heading of the Vienna Programme of Action.” Id. ¶ 6.
56
Id. ¶ 32.
57
See Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83, ¶ 21
(Mar. 14, 2001) (indicating that the commission apointed Juan Méndez as one of its two
delegates).
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mid-1990s had met the requirements of international law.58 In 2012,
a little over a decade later, he wrote that, due to its “rapid evolution,”
international law would no longer support “the South African-style
‘conditional amnesty’ . . . if it covered war crimes, crimes against humanity (including disappearances), or torture.”59
Méndez’s interpretation of the international law on amnesties is
one that is commonly found in the writings of human rights scholars,
international institutions, and human rights courts. While sometimes
the list of crimes for which amnesty cannot be granted is articulated
largely in humanitarian law terms, as in his statement above, other
times it is put primarily in human rights terms. For example, in Barrios Altos v. Peru, the case in which Méndez participated and that I
consider in some detail below, the IACHR referred to “serious human
rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
execution and forced disappearance,” noting that they all “violate
non-derogable rights recognized by international human rights law.”60
Although they are in the minority, a few scholars today maintain
that nothing in international law prohibits a state from granting amnesty, including in at least some of the categories listed above, or that
the question is at least unsettled.61 They generally base their analysis
58
See Garth Meintjes & Juan E. Méndez, Reconciling Amnesties with Universal Jurisdiction,
2 INT’L L.F. D. INT’L 76, 88 (2000) (discussing South Africa’s amnesty as “a significant step
in the evolution of domestic efforts to deal with the past in a manner that satisfies the
requirements of international law”). In fact, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission continued to be held out as a model for some time so that, even during the Rome
Conference establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), some regarded it as representative of an instance where the ICC should refrain from prosecution. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan endorsed this position, stating that it would be “inconceivable” for
the ICC to “substitute its judgment for that of a whole nation which is seeking the best way
to put a traumatic past behind it and build a better future.” Charles Villa-Vicencio,Why
Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal Court and Truth
Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L. J. 205, 205–22 (2000) (quoting Kofi Annan, Speech at the
Witwatersrand University Graduation Ceremony (Sept. 1, 1998)).
59
Juan E. Méndez, Foreword to AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, at xxiii (Francesca Lessa & Leigh A.
Payne eds., 2012).
60
Barrios Altos, ¶ 41. It is also common to see lists that include a combination of
humanitarian and human rights terms, such as that in a report on amnesties by the United
Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights that states that “United Nations bodies,
officials and experts have condemned amnesties for war crimes; genocide; crimes against
humanity; and other gross violations of human rights, such as extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, torture and similar cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; slavery;
and enforced disappearance, including gender-specific instances of these violations.” Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States:
Amnesties, at 27, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/09/1 (2009).
61
See, e.g., MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS: AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE
32 (2009) (“There is not a single treaty that, in an explicit way, even discourages any kind
of amnesty.”); WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS
AT THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 177–88 (2012) (“It might be safer to say that although state
practice is evolving, and that amnesties in peace agreements are increasingly viewed with
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on international humanitarian law and, as I explain more fully below,
have had relatively little impact on human rights jurisprudence.62
As Méndez suggests, the prominence of this view on the illegality
of amnesties is relatively recent. Notwithstanding the Vienna Declaration’s 1993 call on states to repeal legislation that would grant impunity to those who have committed grave human rights violations and
to prosecute such crimes,63 the issue of whether truth commissions,
international criminal institutions, or even amnesties offer the greatest promise for responding to mass atrocities was seriously debated
among human rights advocates during the late-1980s and mid-1990s.
In what were often referred to as the “truth versus justice” and “peace
versus justice” debates, “justice” referred to criminal prosecutions, and
disfavour, a prohibitive legal rule has not crystallized.”); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INST., THE
BELFAST GUIDELINES ON AMNESTY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 38 (2013), available at http://
www.transitionaljustice.ulster.ac.uk/documents/TheBelfastGuidelinesonAmnestyand
Accountability.pdf (discussing Guideline 6, which “addresses the most unsettled area of
international law on amnesties, namely the extent to which amnesties for international
crimes are prohibited under customary international law”); Mark Freeman & Max Pensky,
The Amnesty Controversy in International Law, in AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 42, 44 (“Yet in this area, what stands out the most is the
absence of an explicit prohibition of amnesty in any human rights, humanitarian, or criminal treaty.”); Max Pensky, Amnesty on Trial: Impunity, Accountability, and the Norms of International Law, 1 ETHICS & GLOBAL POL. 1, 8–11 (2008) (contending that the legality of
amnesties under international law remains unsettled); Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507, 505–27
(1999) (“[T]here are frequently no international legal constraints to the negotiation of an
amnesty for peace deal.”).
Note that Méndez’s quotation, supra text accompanying note 59, comes from the foreword he authored for the book in which Freeman and Pensky’s article on the amnesty
controversy appears. With regard to their chapter, Méndez simply states that the language
they rely on from Protocol II to the Geneva Convention (which I discuss infra at notes
106–08 and accompanying text) “has been authoritatively interpreted to mean [that states]
. . . may not condone violations of international law in cases of international crimes or
grave breaches of human rights and humanitarian law.” Méndez, supra note 59, at xxii
(internal citations omitted). Making no reference to their argument that the law is unsettled even with regard to those crimes, he cites a 2010 report from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and a letter written by the head of the ICRC Legal
Division in 1977. Id. at xxii n.35. See infra note 111 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the ICRC’s interpretation of the provision.
62
One such group of scholars, which includes Freeman and Schabas, wrote an amicus
brief in a case before the ECHR Grand Chamber to respond to the initial panel’s statement
that international law increasingly considers amnesty for international crimes to be prohibited. The scholars “urge[d] the Grand Chamber to adopt a more legally sound and
nuanced approach that recognizes the uncertain picture presented by custom as well as the
weaknesses in the claim that there is any support for the prohibition of amnesty in treaty
law.” Brief for Third Party Interveners at 8, Margus̆ v. Croatia, App. No. 4455/10 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 2014). The brief primarily focuses on international humanitarian law and, strikingly,
does not once mention the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. For discussion of the Grand Chamber’s decision in the case, see infra notes
143–51 and accompanying text. For elaboration on the position of this group of scholars,
see TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 61.
63
Vienna Declaration, supra note 50, ¶ 60 (discussed infra note 50 and accompanying
text).
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many considered that truth and peace might be incompatible with
criminal punishment, in part because immunity (if not impunity)
might be necessary to get perpetrators to reveal the truth or agree to a
peaceful transition of government.
In the remainder of this section, I consider how this change in
attitude and doctrine occurred and suggest that it worked in tandem
with a shift in perspective on the relationship between truth and
peace, on one hand, and justice, on the other. I begin with the 1996
decision by the Constitutional Court of South Africa upholding the
amnesty provisions of the country’s 1995 Act to promote national reconciliation. I use the decision to illustrate the not uncommon understanding at the time that criminal prosecutions were in conflict with
goals of truth and peace, as well as forgiveness. I then turn to the
jurisprudence of the IACHR, which has ruled against the state in every
case in which amnesty laws have been challenged. I demonstrate how,
while the IACHR also shares the goals of truth and to a certain extent
peace (though not forgiveness), it sees criminal punishment as central—rather than opposed—to the achievement of those goals. Following my analysis of these contrasting approaches, I discuss how the
IACHR jurisprudence has migrated to other human rights regimes,
including the European Court of Human Rights and the African Commission on Human Rights. Finally, I discuss that, despite a growing
consensus among human rights advocates and judges against amnesties, they nevertheless persist.
1. Truth, Peace, and Forgiveness Versus Justice:
South Africa and Beyond
In 1995, in accordance with its 1993 interim Constitution, South
Africa passed its Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act,
which established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.64
Among its purposes, the commission was meant to facilitate “the
granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the
relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective.”65
The Act extinguished criminal and civil liability for individuals who
were granted amnesty and shielded the state and others from civil and
vicarious liability.66 In Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v. President of South Africa, an organization representing the Black Consciousness Movement and the families of several prominent anti-apartheid
64
S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, postamble; Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 § 2 (S. Afr.).
65
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, § 3(1)(b).
66
Id. § 20(7).
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victims challenged the constitutionality of the Act.67 They argued that
the amnesty was inconsistent with section 22 of the interim Constitution, which provided that “ ‘[e]very person shall have the right to have
justiciable disputes settled by a court of law or, where appropriate,
another independent or impartial forum.’ ”68
In its 1996 decision in AZAPO, the Constitutional Court upheld
the legislation. In doing so, it deployed rationales based on truth,
peace, and forgiveness. With regard to truth, the court explained:
That truth, which the victims of repression seek so desperately to
know is, in the circumstances, much more likely to be forthcoming
if those responsible for such monstrous misdeeds are encouraged to
disclose the whole truth with the incentive that they will not receive
the punishment which they undoubtedly deserve if they do.69

The court did not deny, then, that perpetrators deserved punishment,
but it saw punishment and truth as incompatible and elevated the latter in the interest of all victims, including the applicants in the case
who sought the opposite result. The court continued: “Without that
incentive there is nothing to encourage such persons to make the disclosures and to reveal the truth which persons in the positions of the
applicants so desperately desire.”70
Similarly, the AZAPO decision emphasized that peace and prosecution were in conflict. It saw the amnesty provision as central to the
Constitution’s “historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided
society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice,
and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy
and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all
South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.”71 Indeed, the court explained, “but for a mechanism providing for amnesty, the ‘historic bridge’ itself might never have been erected.”72
The court continued:
67
Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA
671 (CC). The plaintiffs included the family of anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko, who was
tortured and died while in police custody in 1977. Biko had been one of the primary
theorists of and advocates for Black Consciousness. For more information on AZAPO, see
http://azapo.org.za/azapohistory/azapo-and-bcma-historical-background/. For more information on Biko, see STEVE BIKO, I WRITE WHAT I LIKE (Aelred Stubbs ed., 3d ed. 2002).
For discussion of judicial opinions by both the High Court and Constitutional Court, see
ANTJE DU BOIS-PEDAIN, TRANSITIONAL AMNESTY IN SOUTH AFRICA, 29–37 (2007). For a contemporary reflection on the case, see DM Davis, The South African Truth Commission and the
Azapo Case: A Reflection Almost Two Decades Later, in ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS
AGENDA (Karen Engle, Zinaida Miller & DM Davis eds., forthcoming 2016).
68
See AZAPO, ¶¶ 7–8.
69
Id. ¶ 17.
70
Id.
71
Id. ¶ 3, n.1 (quoting S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, postamble).
72
Id. ¶ 19.
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If the Constitution kept alive the prospect of continuous retaliation
and revenge, the agreement of those threatened by its implementation might never have been forthcoming, and if it had, the bridge
itself would have remained wobbly and insecure, threatened by fear
from some and anger from others. It was for this reason that those
who negotiated the Constitution made a deliberate choice, preferring understanding over vengeance, reparation over retaliation,
ubuntu over victimisation.73

The amnesty process was thus key to both building and maintaining a
peaceful transition.
In addition to facilitating truth and peace, the court considered
that amnesty led to forgiveness.74 Forgiveness had been central to the
transitional aims of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act.75 As
Archbishop Desmond Tutu explained its function in the foreword to
the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission when it
was issued in 1998: “Having looked the beast of the past in the eye,
having asked and received forgiveness and having made amends, let
us shut the door on the past—not in order to forget it but in order
not to allow it to imprison us.”76 In its own discussion of forgiveness,
the court saw it as important to victims, perpetrators, and the nation
as a whole:
[W]hat might unfold are objectives fundamental to the ethos of a
new constitutional order. The families of those unlawfully tortured,
maimed or traumatised become more empowered to discover the
truth, the perpetrators become exposed to opportunities to obtain
relief from the burden of a guilt or an anxiety they might be living
with for many long years, the country begins the long and necessary
process of healing the wounds of the past, transforming anger and
grief into a mature understanding and creating the emotional and
structural climate essential for the ‘reconciliation and reconstruction’ which informs the very difficult and sometimes painful objectives of the amnesty articulated in the epilogue.77

73

Id.
See id. ¶ 17 (noting that amnesty “begins the long and necessary process of healing
the wounds of the past, transforming anger and grief into a mature understanding and
creating the emotional and structural climate essential for the ‘reconciliation and
reconstruction’”).
75
See Explanatory Memorandum to the Parliamentary Bill, Dep’t of Justice and Constitutional Dev., http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/legal/bill.htm (last visited May 15, 2015)
(The National Unity and Reconciliation Act “is based on the principle that reconciliation
depends on forgiveness and that forgiveness can only take place if gross violations of
human rights are fully disclosed.”).
76
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, 1 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF
SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 22 (1998), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalre
port/Volume%201.pdf.
77
See AZAPO, ¶ 17.
74
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Thus, for both the Constitutional Court and the legislation it upheld,
amnesty served important instrumental and moral functions for victims as well as perpetrators.
This understanding of a dichotomous relationship between justice (meaning criminal justice), on one hand, and truth, peace, and
forgiveness, on the other, could be found in most debates about and
reflections on the issue of amnesty at the time. Both those who supported and those who opposed amnesties generally accepted that they
had to choose between these conflicting aims.78 Even those who were
ambivalent about whether amnesty should be granted in particular
circumstances generally conceded that one or all of the truth, peace,
and forgiveness trilogy might have to be sacrificed for justice—or vice
versa.79
Over time, however, most human rights advocates, institutions,
and courts began to reject the dichotomies, seeing prosecutions as
necessary to truth, and often to peace. (As I discuss below, forgiveness
largely dropped out of the picture.) Consequently, the truth versus
justice and peace versus justice debates waned. This shift in approach
can be found in IACHR decisions striking down amnesty laws as well
as in the United Nations human rights documents and policies
78
But see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave
Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449, 481–82 (1990) (providing
an early effort to tie prosecution to truth: “Prosecution constitutes an important avenue for
recounting because it puts the state’s resources at the service of truth-telling and because it
identifies those responsible . . . .”).
79
See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 10 (1998) (noting that in addition to truth and justice, “[t]here is another basic, perhaps implicit pair of goals or responses to collective
violence—vengeance and forgiveness”); Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes:
Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Past, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 7, 43 (1995)
(positing questions about the compatibility of justice with truth and reconciliation: “What
is the point of knowledge without justice? Should justice or truth be the guiding aim of
accountability? Is punishment through the criminal justice system a suitable means of arriving at knowledge? . . . Is justice compatible with reconciliation?”); Nino, supra note 11, at
2620 (acknowledging “valuable consequences of punishment” while counseling that “prosecutions may have some limit and must be counterbalanced with the aim of preserving the
democratic system”); Scharf, supra note 61, at 507 (discussing the “paradoxical question of
whether the International Criminal Court will require justice at the expense of peace”);
José Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1425, 1432–33 (1992)
(“Righting a wrong and resolving not to do it again is, at its core, the same philosophy that
underpins Judeo-Christian beliefs about atonement, penance, forgiveness, and reconciliation. At a societal level, the equivalent of penance is criminal justice. Yet the Chilean
government’s assessment of the situation led it to conclude that priority ought to be given
to disclosure of the truth. This disclosure was deemed an inescapable imperative. Justice
would not be foregone, but pursued to the extent possible given the existing political restraints. Forms of justice other than prosecuting the crimes of the past, such as vindicating
the victims and compensating their families, could be achieved more fully. The underlying
assumption, which I share, was that if Chile gave truth and justice equal priority, the result
might well have been that neither could be achieved.”).

R
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eschewing amnesty laws on which the court often relies. Although
others have recited the IACHR jurisprudence on the legality of amnesties in judicial decisions and legal scholarship, I focus on them here
with an eye toward their attempted mediation of the dichotomies that
were relied upon in AZAPO.
2. Justice as Facilitating Truth and Perhaps Peace and Forgiveness:
The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights
In a series of cases between 2001 and 2012, the IACHR found
amnesty laws in Peru, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and El Salvador to be
incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights. In
the first few cases, the court relied partly on the language of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action referenced earlier.80 As
time went on, though, it also began to resurrect Velásquez-Rodrı́guez to
support its position, even though it is unlikely that anyone was thinking about amnesty when Velásquez-Rodrı́guez was decided.81 While from
today’s vantage point the court’s reasoning and conclusions might appear natural, the decisions were not uniformly anticipated, partly as a
result of many of the debates mentioned above.
Indeed in the early-1990s, the Inter-American Commission, which
refers cases to the IACHR, issued resolutions stating that amnesty laws
in Argentina,82 El Salvador,83 and Uruguay84 violated the American
Convention. It left open the possibility, however, that some states
might be permitted to forego criminal prosecution and punishment
80
See Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83, ¶ 4
(Mar. 14, 2001) (Cançado Trindade, J., concurring); see also Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
219, ¶ 153 (Nov. 24, 2010) (noting that the Vienna Declaration emphasized that States
“should derogate legislation that favors the impunity of those responsible for serious
humans rights violations”); Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221, ¶ 202 (Feb. 24, 2011). See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text for the relevant language in the Vienna Declaration.
81
See Gomes Lund, ¶ 137 (stating, with reference to Velásquez-Rodrı́guez that “[s]ince its
first judgment, this Court has highlighted the importance of the State’s obligation to investigate and punish for human rights violations”); Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places
v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
252, ¶ 144 (Oct. 25, 2012) (citing Velásquez-Rodrı́guez when discussing a state’s legal obligation to prevent and punish human rights violations).
82
See Alicia Consuelo Herrera v. Argentina, Case 10.147, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 (1992) (involving “[forced] disappearances, summary executions, torture, [and] kidnapping”).
83
See Masacre Las Hojas v. El Salvador, Case 10.287, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 26/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 (1992) (regarding an army massacre of seventyfour civilians).
84
See Hugo Leonardo v. Uruguay, Case 10.029, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
29/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 (1992) (regarding forced disappearances and kidnapping of children).
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as long as they conducted an adequate investigation and provided
compensation.85 Despite the commission’s negative treatment of the
amnesty laws of Argentina and El Salvador, when the South African
Constitutional Court decided AZAPO in 1996, it referred favorably to
the amnesty and truth-seeking practices in those countries as well as in
Chile.86 That same year, the Inter-American Commission began to
oppose amnesty more explicitly, stating in two resolutions regarding
Chile that amnesties that foreclose prosecution and punishment for
“serious” human rights violations violate the American Convention.87
Yet the commission did not refer any of the cases on the legality of
amnesty to the court in the 1990s, likely because it was well aware that
its conclusions were contested. It did not want to risk rejection of its
position by the court, which might then be seen as offering judicial
sanction to the amnesty laws.88
85
This exception was narrow, as it was limited to states that did not already afford
victims the right to initiate and participate in criminal proceedings. See Douglass Cassel,
Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 211–14 (1996), for a relatively contemporaneous discussion of the
cases and the commission’s determination that, despite significant variations among the
amnesty laws in the three countries, all violated the states’ duties under the American
Convention to investigate human rights violations, provide adequate compensation to victims and survivors, and afford victims a fair trial.
86
See Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4)
SA 671 (CC) at 22–23 paras. 22–24.
87
Cassel, supra note 85, at 215–17 (discussing Garay Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 36/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 ¶¶ 77, 105–09
(1996); Meneses Reyes v. Chile, Case 11.228, 11.229, 11.231, 11.282, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 34/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 76, 103–08 (1996)).
88
The commission’s failure to refer any such cases does not mean that amnesty did
not arise as an issue before the court. In 1998, for example, in Loayza-Tamayo, the court
responded to Peru’s invocation of its amnesty law to defend against a claim that it had
failed to investigate an alleged arbitrary detention, thus arguably offering the court a
chance to rule on whether Peru’s amnesty law violated the Convention. Loayza-Tamayo v.
Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 42, ¶¶ 1–2 (Nov.
27, 1998). Even while rejecting Peru’s defense, the majority of the court declined to rule
on the legality of the amnesty. See id. ¶ 49. In concurrence, however, two judges went
further, stating that “so-called self-proclaimed amnesties pertaining to violations of human
rights” are incompatible with Article 1(1) and Article 2 of the Convention. Id. ¶¶ 1–4
(Cançado Trindade, J. and Abreu-Burelli, J., jointly concurring). Judge Sergio Garcı́a-Ramı́rez, in contrast, adopted his concurrence in a separate case, stating “the Court’s judgment does not dismiss the advisability and need of amnesty provisions that serve to restore
peace.” Id. (Garcı́a-Ramı́rez, J., concurring) (adopting his concurrence in Castillo-Páez v.
Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 43, ¶ 6–12 (Nov.
27, 1998)). Discussing contemporaneous debates about amnesty within the human rights
movement, he argued that although impunity should be limited, democratically enacted
amnesties that do not preclude prosecution for grievous human rights violations remain
admissible under international law. Id.
The same day the court issued its judgment in Loayza-Tamayo, it issued a reparations
judgment in Castillo-Páez. Id. In that case, in which Peru had invoked its amnesty law to
defend its failure to investigate an arbitrary detention and subsequent disappearance, one
of the attorneys representing the family of the disappeared individual asked the court to
rule on the incompatibility of Peru’s amnesty laws with its international obligations.

R
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By 2000, however, the landscape had changed. In that year, the
commission brought a case against Peru to what it hoped would be a
receptive court and argued that the country’s amnesty law violated the
American Convention.89 The commission was successful, and the
court’s 2001 decision in that case, Barrios Altos v. Peru, is considered
momentous for its finding that self-amnesty laws are “manifestly incompatible with the aims and spirit of the [American] Convention [of
Human Rights].”90 The court followed earlier, arguably creative, interpretations of the Convention by the commission to find specific
violations of Article 8, setting forth the right to a fair trial for criminal
defendants, and Article 25, recognizing the right to judicial protection, or to recourse “to a competent court or tribunal for protection
against acts that violate [an individual’s] fundamental rights.”91 By
the time the court’s decision was handed down, impunity had become
a clear target of the human rights movement, and it thus is fitting that
the court articulated its opposition to self-amnesty laws on the ground
Castillo-Páez, ¶ 98. The commission supported the request, although it had not originally
raised the issue, either on the merits or with regard to reparations. See id. ¶¶ 99–100.
Aligning itself with the 1997 Joinet Report (see supra note 54 and accompanying text), the
commission argued that “impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations
to investigate violations, to take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that they are prosecuted, tried, and duly punished.” Id. ¶ 100 (quoting Commission at public hearing). The court responded by
reaffirming its holding in the earlier judgment on Peru. Id. ¶ 105. While it reiterated the
state’s duty to investigate, prosecute, and avoid impunity, the court stopped short of declaring the amnesty illegal. See id. ¶¶ 105–08. In another joint concurrence, Judges Cançado
Trindade and Abreu-Burelli echoed their position in Loayza-Tamayo, and Garcı́a-Ramı́rez
filed the concurrence he adopted in Loayza-Tamayo. See id. ¶¶ 1–3 (Cançado Trindade, J.
and Abreu-Burelli, J., jointly concurring), ¶¶ 1–12 (Garcı́a-Ramı́rez, J., concurring);
Loayza-Tamayo, ¶¶ 1–4 (Cançado Trindade, J. and Abreu-Burelli, J., jointly concurring),
(Garcı́a-Ramı́rez, J., concurring).
89
See Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83 (Mar.
14, 2001).
90
Id. ¶ 43. In 2006, the court issued another decision finding Peru in violation of the
Convention for failing to make efforts to locate the disappeared or to initiate proceedings
against those thought to be responsible for a 1992 massacre. See La Cantuta v. Perú, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, (Nov. 29, 2006)
(Garcı́a-Ramı́rez, J., concurring). In a separate concurrence, Judge Sergio Garcı́a-Ramı́rez
summarized the “Inter-American view on self-amnesty.” Id. ¶¶ 1–8. For further discussion
of La Cantuta, see Fábia Fernandes Carvalho Veçoso, Between Human Rights Absolutism
and Contextual History: Aspects of the Experience of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights 41–43 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of São Paulo).
91
American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M.
673 (1970) (entered into force 18 July 1978); Barrios Altos, ¶ 42. The court also found
violations of Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention, which include general provisions on
states’ obligations to respect and ensure all rights in the Convention, including through
legislation. Barrios Altos, ¶ 42. The state of Peru did not contest the commission’s arguments applying these provisions, and the court therefore simply accepted them in this case.
Their articulation can be found in earlier commission decisions. See, e.g., Garay Hermosilla,
¶ 53; Alicia Consuelo Herrera v. Argentina, Case 10.147, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 ¶ 50 (1992).
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that they ‘‘lead to the defenselessness of victims and perpetuate impunity.”92 Each subsequent challenge to an amnesty law afforded the
court the opportunity to expand that decision’s reach.
In 2006, in Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, the IACHR struck down
Chile’s amnesty law, which was not technically a self-amnesty law because it applied in principle to political opponents as well.93 The
court found, however, that the amnesty functioned as self-amnesty
“since it was issued by the military regime to avoid judicial prosecution
of its own crimes” and therefore violated the Convention.94 At the
same time, the court suggested that its holding might not be limited
to self-amnesties.95
In 2010, in Gomes Lund v. Brazil, the court considered the Brazilian amnesty law, which was not a self-amnesty law both because it had
been legislatively adopted and because it applied to members of the
guerilla groups as well as state actors.96 The court nevertheless found
the law in violation of the Convention, expanding its previous holdings: “In regard to [arguments] by the parties regarding whether the
case deals with an amnesty, self-amnesty, or ‘political agreement,’ the
Court notes . . . that the non-compatibility with the Convention includes amnesties of serious human rights violations and is not limited
to those which are denominated, ‘self-amnesties.’ ”97
Having made both the source of amnesty laws and the question of
whom they apply to irrelevant, the court seemingly seamlessly invalidated the Uruguayan amnesty law in 2011, in Gelman v. Uruguay.98
There, the court cited its own precedent and international law more
generally in support of its broad holding that “amnesty laws are, in
cases of serious violations of human rights, expressly incompatible
with the letter and spirit of the [American Convention of Human
Rights].”99 In fact, Uruguay had argued that its case required unique
92

Barrios Altos, ¶ 43.
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶¶ 115–22 (Sept. 26, 2006).
94
Id. ¶ 120.
95
Id. (“[E]ven though the Court notes that Decree Law No. 2.191 basically grants a
self-amnesty . . . it points out that a State violates the American Convention when issuing
provisions which do not conform to the obligations contemplated in said Convention . . . .
[T]he Court . . . addresses the ratio legis: granting an amnesty for the serious criminal acts
contrary to international law that were committed by the military regime.”). The court also
noted that amnesties that do not exclude crimes against humanity “are overtly incompatible with the wording and the spirit of the American Convention, and undoubtedly affect
rights embodied in such Convention.” Id. ¶ 119.
96
Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶¶ 134–36. (Nov. 24, 2010).
97
Id. ¶ 175.
98
Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 221, ¶¶ 241–46 (Feb. 24, 2011).
99
Id. ¶ 226.
93
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treatment because, unlike any other country in the world, Uruguay
had held two popular referenda—in 1989 and in 2009—in which voters rejected the opportunity to repeal the law.100 The court reinforced its view that the source of the law was irrelevant, stating: “[T]he
protection of human rights constitutes a[n] impassable limit to the
rule of the majority, that is, to the forum of the ‘possible to be decided’ by the majorities in the democratic instance . . . .”101
In 2012, the IACHR handed down its most recent decision on
amnesties. In its decision in Massacres of El Mozote & Nearby Places v. El
Salvador, the court entered new doctrinal terrain.102 The challenged
amnesty was passed in the early-1990s, not necessarily as a part of, but
definitely in the context of, the peace agreement that ended the internal armed conflict in the country.103 While the court could simply
have decided the case based on its previous reasoning invalidating
amnesties—regardless of their source or impetus—as a matter of
human rights law, doing so might have been read to conflict with international humanitarian law, which, as I noted above, some have argued might permit amnesties.104 It therefore used the opportunity to
interpret the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Convention, applicable to noninternational armed conflict. According to a
concurring opinion in the case, the court incorporated “international
100
The referendum failed in 1989 by roughly thirteen points and in 2009 by roughly
five points. Id. ¶¶ 147, 149. Some argue that many voted against repeal in 2009, not
because they favored impunity but because, since 2005, President Tabaré Vásquez, a former Tupamaro and the first president elected from the left-wing Frente Amplio, had—unlike
any other president—been approving the launching of investigations under a loophole in
the 1986 law. For a discussion of some of the ways he did so, see Louise Mallinder, Impunity, Accountability and Public Participation: Uruguay’s Evolving Experience of Amnesty
Laws 96–100 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/
louise_mallinder/1. Vásquez ended his five-year presidential term in 2010, but was elected
to become president once again beginning in March 2015. For further discussion of the
Gelman case and of the history of debates around amnesty in Uruguay, see Karen Engle,
Self-critique, (Anti)politics and Criminalization: Reflections on the History and Trajectory of the
Human Rights Movement, in NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 41, 61–67 (José Marı́a Beneyto & David Kennedy eds., 2012).
101
Gelman, ¶ 239.
102
Massacres of El Mozote & Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252 (Oct. 25, 2012).
103
See id. ¶¶ 288–89. The Peace Accord contained a paragraph entitled “End to impunity,” which indicated that particular acts should be “the object of exemplary action by the
law courts so that the punishment prescribed by law is meted out to those found responsible.” Id. ¶ 272. The 1992 National Reconciliation Law similarly excluded from the amnesty “anyone who, according to the report of the Truth Commission, had taken part in
grave acts of violence . . . whose impact on society demands, with the utmost urgency, that
the public know the truth, regardless of the sector to which he or she belongs.” Id. ¶ 289
(quoting National Reconciliation Law (Legislative Decree No. 147/1992) (El Salvador)).
In March, 1993, however, shortly after the Truth Commission presented its report, the
legislature enacted the Law of General Amnesty for the Consolidation of Peace, which
extended amnesty to those seemingly excluded by it in the previous legislation. Id. ¶ 291.
104
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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humanitarian law elements to produce an interpretation that harmonized with the obligations established in the American
Convention.”105
Article 6(5) of Protocol II states that “[a]t the end of hostilities,
the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict.”106 It is the main legal provision on which those who defend the
legality or uncertain legal status of amnesties rely.107 Indeed, the
South African Constitutional Court had interpreted the provision to
favor amnesty in the AZAPO decision.108
The IACHR’s unanimous opinion in El Mozote interpreted Article
6(5) to exclude amnesties that preclude the investigation and prosecution of war crimes, such as the December 1981 military massacres in
El Mozote and nearby communities at issue in the case.109 Although
there have been ongoing debates over the meaning of that provision,110 the judgment made no reference to them. Moreover, the sole
support it offered for its interpretation is the study of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) on customary international humanitarian law, with which some scholars disagree.111 The
court thus created human rights case law on the meaning of Protocol
II, finding El Salvador’s amnesty law incompatible with it, at least to
the extent that the amnesty law covers individuals who have
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. It then found the
105
Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶ 16 (Oct. 25, 2012) (Garcı́a-Sayán,
J., concurring)
106
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 6(5),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 613.
107
See, e.g., Freeman & Pensky, supra note 61, at 44 (”The majority of national courts
that have applied Article 6(5) have used it as a legal basis to validate or uphold amnesties
covering serious crimes.”); Brief for Third Party Interveners, supra note 62, at 2–3.
108
Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA
671 (CC) at 28 para. 30 (S. Afr.).
109
El Mozote, ¶¶ 285–87.
110
For additional discussion around Article 6(5) and its interpretations, see SCHABAS,
supra note 61, at 178–80 (reviewing the literature that has been written on Article 6(5)).
111
El Mozote, ¶ 286 n.461. The court cites—as a “Cf.”—Rule 159 of the ICRC’s study,
which provides that “‘[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in power must endeavor to
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in a non-international armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed
conflict, with the exception of persons suspected of, accused of or sentenced for war
crimes.’” The ICRC thus maintains that Article 6(5) cannot be construed to allow amnesty
for individuals guilty of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
For an argument that state practice and opinion juris do not support the ICRC’s interpretation of the provision or its claim about the status of customary international law on
amnesty, see Kieran McEvoy & Louise Mallinder, Amnesties, Transitional Justice and Governing Through Mercy, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 434, 440–41
(Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks eds., 2013).
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state responsible for violations of the American Convention and other
American treaties for its failure to provide an “effective remedy to
guarantee the rights of access to justice and to know the truth by the
investigation and eventual punishment of those responsible.”112
Although the court’s judgment made clear its view that amnesties
granted for war crimes or crimes against humanity would violate the
Convention, five of the seven judges of the court signed a concurring
opinion, which was authored by Judge Garcia-Sayán, the president of
the court. As I discuss below, that concurrence was more open to the
possibility of a permissible amnesty under international humanitarian
law than the judgment might suggest and has been referenced favorably by those scholars who have argued for the possible legality of
amnesty.
With the potential exception of the concurrence in El Mozote, as
the court has deepened and broadened its jurisprudence on amnesty
laws through this line of cases, it has also attempted to mediate the
tension that the South African Constitutional Court and early human
rights and transitional justice advocates saw between truth and justice
and peace and justice. It has done so in large part by finding that
criminal investigation and punishment are required for truth and, if
to a lesser extent, peace.
a. Truth
The “right to truth” has done much of the work in attempting to
ameliorate the tension between truth and justice. Each of the amnesty cases has afforded the court an opportunity to state its view of
the right to truth, as each raised at some level the question of the
relationship between access to truth and the prohibition on amnesty.
Even as the court has felt its way on the questions about the source of
the right to truth (whether it is an “independent right,” as was urged
by representatives in the El Mozote case, or “subsumed” in certain articles of the Convention, as was first stated in Barrios Altos and expanded
by later case law), it has continually asserted that truth and criminal
justice, far from being in opposition, are in line with each other. As
such, unlike the Constitutional Court of South Africa, it has avoided
having to choose between the two.
Three understandings of the relationship between criminal trials
and truth emerge in the IACHR’s jurisprudence. First, the court suggests that truth is one of the purposes of criminal investigations and
prosecutions. As the judgment in Barrios Altos puts it:
[T]he right to the truth is subsumed in the right of the victim or his
next of kin to obtain clarification of the events that violated human
112

El Mozote, ¶¶ 299, 301.
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rights and the corresponding responsibilities from the competent
organs of the State, through the investigation and prosecution that
are established in Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention.113

Similar language appears in Almonacid-Arellano as well.114
Second, the court, especially in more recent cases, makes clear
that it considers amnesty provisions to be in violation of the right to
truth. It references and follows United Nations documents to identify
a right to truth and, once that right is established, to consider the
implications for amnesty of such a right. Accordingly, both the Gomes
Lund and Gelman decisions state that “amnesties and other analogous
measures contribute to impunity and constitute an obstacle to the
right to the truth in that they block an investigation of the facts on the
merits.”115 Moreover, citing the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, they conclude, based largely on the
right to truth, that amnesties are incompatible with states’ obligations
under “various sources of international law.”116
Finally, the court rejects the possibility that truth commissions
without criminal prosecutions might fulfill the right to truth. While
not disparaging the existence or creation of truth commissions, the
court’s decisions make clear that such commissions “do not substitute
the obligation of the State to establish the truth and ensure the legal
determination of individual responsibility by means of criminal legal
procedures.”117 Rather, the state has the obligation to open and
expedite criminal investigations to determine the corresponding
responsibilities.118
113
Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83, ¶ 48
(Mar. 14, 2001).
114
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 148 (Sept. 26, 2006) (“[T]he right
to know the truth is included in the right of victims or their next of kin to have the harmful
acts and the corresponding responsibilities elucidated by competent State bodies, through
the investigation and prosecution provided for in Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention.”).
115
Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶ 151 (Nov. 24, 2010) (citing Office of the
U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rep., Right to the Truth, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/5/
7 (June 7, 2007)) (“Accordingly, a direct connection is made between the right to the
truth and such measures as amnesties or other juridical arrangements of comparable effect, since these measures not only promote impunity: they also pose a major obstacle to
efforts to uphold the right to the truth by inhibiting the conduct of full inquiries.”). Identical language appears in Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221, ¶ 199 (Feb. 24, 2011).
116
Gomes Lund, ¶ 151 (citing Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights,
Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties, at V, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/09/1 (2009)).
Identical language appears in Gelman, ¶ 199.
117
Gomes Lund, ¶ 297; see La Cantuta v. Perú, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 224 (Nov. 29, 2006); El Mozote, ¶¶ 298, 316.
118
See cases cited in id.
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Thus, as the right to truth has developed jurisprudentially—
largely at the urging of human rights advocates—criminal prosecutions have come to be seen as essential to that right. Unlike in
AZAPO, truth and criminal justice now fit hand-in-glove.
b. Peace
In the early amnesty cases, the court mostly avoided addressing
the relationship between peace and justice. To the extent that it did
consider the issue, it seemed to accept, much like the Constitutional
Court of South Africa in AZAPO, that the two might conflict. Yet it
reached the opposite result, choosing the prohibition on amnesty
over peace. The concurring opinion in Barrios Altos by Judge
Garcı́a-Ramı́rez, for example, tackled the issue directly by acknowledging “the advisability of encouraging civic harmony through amnesty
laws that contribute to reestablishing peace.”119 It nevertheless insisted (in line with “a growing sector of doctrine and also the InterAmerican Court”) that such “forgive and forget provisions ‘cannot be
permitted to cover up the most severe human rights violations, violations that constitute an utter disregard for the dignity of the human
being and are repugnant to the conscience of humanity.’ ”120 The
court’s positive reference in Almonacid-Arellano to the United Nations
Secretary-General’s position that “all peace agreements approved by
the United Nations can never promise amnesty for crimes against humanity”121 suggested a similar view; in instances in which they are not
both achievable, criminal justice is preferable to peace.
At least until El Mozote, more recent cases by the IACHR have
explicitly questioned the sharp distinction between peace and criminal justice. Indeed, both Gomes Lund and Gelman refer to “the false
dilemma between peace and reconciliation, on the one hand, and justice on the other,” and favorably reference the report on amnesties by
the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights for its
statement that:
The amnesties that exempt from criminal sanction those responsible for atrocious crimes in the hope of securing peace have often
failed to achieve their aim and have instead emboldened their bene119
Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83, ¶ 11
(Mar. 14, 2001) (Garcı́a-Ramı́rez, J., concurring).
120
Id. ¶ 11 (Garcı́a-Ramı́rez, J., concurring) (quoting Castillo-Páez v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 43, ¶ 7 (Nov. 27, 1998)
(Garcı́a-Ramı́rez, J., concurring)).
121
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 107 (Sept. 26, 2006) (citing U.N.
Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,
¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004)). The court quotes identical language in
Gomes Lund, ¶ 150; Gelman, ¶ 198.
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ficiaries to commit further crimes. Conversely, peace agreements
have been reached without amnesty provisions in some situations
where amnesty had been said to be a necessary condition of peace
and where many had feared that indictments would prolong the
conflict.122

The High Commissioner’s reconciliation of criminal justice and peace
avoids a difficult choice, and its sentiment is often heard among opponents of amnesty. Even were amnesty to bring peace, many claim, it
would not be a “lasting peace.”123
Such a position also made its way into the 2010 Kampala Declaration, adopted unanimously at the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court, as an agreed-upon assumption of States Parties.
The preamble declares that “there can be no lasting peace without
justice and that peace and justice are thus complementary requirements.”124 The very next paragraph states that “justice and the fight
against impunity are, and must remain, indivisible.”125
That said, to the extent that amnesties continue to be defended,
peace is generally the justification that is given. Recall that the decision in El Mozote was unanimous, but the court’s president authored a
concurrence signed by a majority of the judges. That concurrence
suggests that the peace argument continues to have some traction. In
the opinion, Judge Garcı́a-Sayán acknowledges the tension that some122
Gomes Lund, ¶ 151; Gelman, ¶ 199 (quoting Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for
Human Rights, supra note 60).
123
A recent statement by AI on the Colombian peace process, for example, states that
“[t]he historic declaration agreed between the Colombian government and the country’s
main guerrilla group, FARC, will not contribute to a lasting peace unless those responsible
for human rights abuses, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, are brought
to justice.” Amnesty Int’l, Historic Colombia-FARC Declaration Fails to Guarantee Victims’ Right
to Justice (June 9, 2014), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/historic-colombia-farc-declara
tion-fails-guarantee-victims-right-justice-2014-06-09. Similarly, in 2013, when Nepal established a truth and reconciliation commission that had the power to grant amnesty, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights complained that “[s]uch amnesties
would not only violate core principles under international law but would also weaken the
foundation for a genuine and lasting peace in Nepal.” Nepal Must Strike Law on Possible
Amnesty for Serious Rights Violations – UN Official, UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 20, 2013), http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44431&Cr=nepal&Cr1=#. Moreover, she
stated, “[a]n amnesty for those who committed serious human rights violations will deny
the right of thousands of Nepalese to truth and justice. This will not provide a sustainable
road to peace.” Several months later, the Nepalese Supreme Court struck down the amnesty, based partly on Nepal’s obligations under the United Nations and on the InterAmerican Court’s jurisprudence. See Basnet & Pokharel v. Gov’t of Nepal & Ors., 069-WS0057, Supreme Court of Nepal, Jan. 2, 2014 (“[T]his provision is against the victims’ fundamental right to justice including their right to life and liberty, right to information, right
against torture, and against the accepted principles of justice.”).
124
Kampala Declaration, RC/Decl.1, pmbl. (June 1, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/icc
docs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Decl.1-ENG.pdf.
125
Id. For a detailed discussion and critique of the position that amnesty is not permitted under the Rome Statute of the ICC or international law more broadly, see SCHABAS,
supra note 61, 177–98.
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times occurs “between justice and the ending of the conflict”126 and
states that “armed conflict and negotiated solutions give rise to various
issues and introduce enormous legal and ethical requirements in the
search to harmonize criminal justice and negotiated peace.”127
Although the opinion states that the aim of peace processes
should be “to ensure that the combatants choose peace and submit to
justice,” it also recognizes that there might be a need to consider devising “alternative or suspended sentences,” taking into account “the
degree of responsibility for serious crimes and the extent to which
responsibility is acknowledged and information is provided about
what happened.”128 Truth telling and identification of perpetrators
seem essential, but criminal punishment—if not investigation—might
ultimately give way to, or at least be balanced by, peace. Indeed, perhaps the greatest doctrinal innovation of Judge Garcı́a-Sayán’s opinion is its statement that “international human rights law should
consider that peace is a right and that the State must achieve it.”129 By
elevating peace from a realpolitik consideration to a right, he puts it
squarely back into the realm of the court’s legal deliberation:
“[T]aking into consideration that none of those rights and obligations
is of an absolute nature, it is legitimate that they be weighed in such a
way that the satisfaction of some does not affect the exercise of the
others disproportionately.”130
Some proponents of the legality of at least certain forms of amnesty have cited the concurrence favorably. Not surprisingly, it has
been referenced in relation to the peace processes in Colombia and
Northern Ireland, both countries in which some forms of amnesties or
reduced sentences are being debated.131 If the opinion is suggesting
126
Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶ 22 (Oct. 25, 2012) (Garcı́a-Sayán,
J., concurring).
127
Id. ¶ 26.
128
Id. ¶ 30; see also id. ¶ 31 (noting that “[r]eduction of sentences, alternative punishments, direct reparation from the perpetrator to the victim, and public acknowledgment of
responsibility are other ways that can be considered”).
129
Id. ¶ 37.
130
Id. ¶ 38.
131
With regard to Colombia, see, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND COLOMBIA’S PEACE TALKS 8, 18–22 (2013), available at http://www.crisisgroup
.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/049-transitional-justice-andcolombia-s-peace-talks.aspx (acknowledging, in the context of a discussion of the concurrence in El Mozote, that “[e]xtensive amnesties, such as those Colombia granted to guerrilla
groups in the 1990s, might no longer be viable [but] there is growing recognition of a
distinction between a transition from armed conflict via negotiated peace and a transition
from authoritarianism,” and calling for amnesties for political crimes that do not include
war crimes and crimes against humanity). The Belfast Guidelines similarly reference the
decision. See TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 61, at 30 (“The case law of international tribunals and human rights monitoring bodies also notes human rights obligations
are not absolute and emphasises the importance of balancing competing obligations, even
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an exception, though, it seems to be a rather narrow one that would
in fact apply to few amnesties to date. Indeed, it makes it clear that it
does not apply to any of the amnesties the court has considered in the
past. Yet by re-recognizing the tension between peace and justice and
suggesting that peace might be a right to be balanced against other
human rights, it at least opens the possibility for bringing some of the
debate over amnesty back into human rights law and discourse.
c. Forgiveness
Recall that the South African Constitutional Court in AZAPO saw
the power of forgiveness, claiming that it was good for perpetrators
and victims alike, as well as for the nation. In the debates over amnesty in Latin America during the same time, forgiveness was also
sometimes invoked as a justification for amnesty.132 Yet, only one
opinion by the IACHR has addressed forgiveness in the context of
amnesty: A concurring opinion by Judge Cançado Trindade, who was
one of the judges on the court most opposed to amnesty even before
Barrios Altos.133 That opinion, in Almonacid-Arellano, stands in contrast
to the perspective in AZAPO. As with the IACHR’s position on peace
in Gomes Lund and Gelman, the opinion attempts to reconcile criminal
justice and forgiveness rather than seeing them in opposition.
Judge Cançado Trindade’s opinion offers a skeptical view of forgiveness as a rationale for amnesty. It refers to forgiveness (along with
“achieving ‘national reconciliation’ through the revelation of the
‘truth’ ”) as a “pretext” for the grant of amnesty.134 It then describes
forgiveness as an individual matter, stating that it “cannot be imposed
by a decree law or otherwise; instead, it can only be granted spontaneously by the victims themselves.”135 Speaking of the victims in the
case, the opinion surmises that “in order to [forgive], they have
in relation to prosecutions for serious crimes. For example, a concurring opinion by the
president of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights supported by four other judges in
the El Mozote v. El Salvador case acknowledged the importance of balancing the right of
victims to peace against the duty to prosecute gross human rights violations.”). According
to the web page on which they are published, the Belfast Guidelines resulted in part from
the debate about “promoting reconciliation and facilitating truth recovery” through amnesty in Northern Ireland, among other countries. Louise Mallinder & Tom Hadden, The
Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability, TRANSITIONAL JUST. INST. http://www.transi
tionaljustice.ulster.ac.uk/TransitionalJusticeInstitute.htmAmnestyGuidelinesProject.htm
(last visited May 15, 2015).
132
See, e.g., supra note 79 (discussing the position of José Zalaquett at the time).
133
See supra note 88 (discussing his concurrences in earlier cases in which amnesty
laws were raised as a defense to state failure to investigate).
134
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 4 (Sept. 26, 2006) (Cançado
Trinidade, J., concurring).
135
Id.
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sought justice.”136 While the contention that forgiveness must be an
individual, not a national, matter is not new,137 Judge Cançado
Trindade has added to that concept here by suggesting that if forgiveness is to take place, criminal justice is the means by which it will generally do so.
It is not surprising that the IACHR does not discuss forgiveness.
It was not a rationale offered by the various states in the cases the
court has considered, at least according to the court’s rendition of the
states’ arguments. Moreover, among human rights advocates, even
the more general questioning of the punitive model of justice on the
ground that forgiveness might offer unique value for both victims and
perpetrators (which criminal justice would impede) has all but
disappeared.138
3. The Influence of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights on Other Jurisdictions
The IACHR has clearly taken the lead on jurisprudence on
amnesties. At least parts of the line of cases reviewed above have often
been cited in other regional human rights courts and commissions as
well as in domestic jurisdictions outside of the Americas. For example, both the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(notwithstanding AZAPO) and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) have used the IACHR decisions to find amnesty laws incompatible with their respective conventions.139
136

Id.
See, e.g., Coalition of NGOs, About the Coalition of NGOs Concerned with Impunity for
Violators of Human Rights, 16 SOC. JUST. 135, 140 (1989) (“In response [to the argument
about reconciliation], we quote a saying from Latin America: only the victims can forgive.”). For further discussion of the relationship between the role of law in individual and
societal forgiveness, see Martha Minow, Forgiveness, Law and Justice 17–21 (Feb. 2014)
(unpublished manuscript).
138
One exception might be with regard to the treatment of child or juvenile soldiers,
where reintegration is strongly encouraged. That only individuals over eighteen can be
tried by the ICC attests to the extent to which the punitive model is seen as inappropriate
for children and youth. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note
18, art. 26. At the same time, the statute does not criminalize recruitment of children aged
fifteen through eighteen. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi). For discussion of this lacuna in the law
and the difficulty with simply forgiving child soldiers, see Minow, supra note 137, at 26–30.
I do not mean to suggest that forgiveness is not discussed. Rather, it is rarely provided
as an explicit justification for amnesty in the way it was in the South African context.
When it is, it has little traction with human rights advocates. For a recent discussion of
various invocations of forgiveness and responses to them in Uganda in the context of the
arrest and transfer to the ICC of LRA leader Dominic Ongwen, see Andrew Green, To
Forgive a Warlord, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 6, 2015) http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/06/
ongwen-uganda-ice-joseph-kony-international-Justice/.
139
See, e.g., Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 245/02,
Judgment, ¶¶ 204, 206, 211 (African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2006) (citing the Inter-American Commission’s rulings on amnesties in Argentina and Uruguay, as
well as the IACHR’s decisions in Velásquez-Rodrı́guez and Barrios Altos, in striking down an
137
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The consideration of amnesty laws in the European human rights
system has generally arisen in a different context from that found in
the American system. While the Inter-American claimants in the cases
I have considered are family members of victims whose cases have remained uninvestigated and unprosecuted due to amnesty laws, claimants in the European cases include criminal defendants who contend
that their human rights (usually due process rights) have been violated because an amnesty granted to them has not been respected.140
The European Convention organs have rendered six decisions that
explicitly involve amnesty laws, including one decision by the Grand
Chamber of the ECHR.141 In part because of the different way that
amnesty law for “‘politically motivated crimes’”); Ould Dah v. France, App. No. 13113/03
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 17, 2009) (citing the American Convention on Human Rights in finding that an amnesty law in Mauritius did not prohibit prosecution in France under a universal jurisdiction statute); Margus̆ v. Croatia, App. No. 4455/10, ¶¶ 60–66, 138 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. May 27, 2014) (Grand Chamber) (discussed infra at notes 143–51 and accompanying
text). For an example of a domestic court that has cited the Inter-American Court cases to
find unconstitutional part of its amnesty law, see Basnet and Pokharel v. Gov’t of Nepal &
Ors., 069-WS-0057, Supreme Court of Nepal, Jan. 2, 2014 (favorably citing Barrios Altos and
Velásquez-Rodrı́guez).
140
Of course, as in Velásquez-Rodrı́guez and many other IACHR cases, victims and their
family members do bring cases before the ECHR alleging that the state has failed to investigate human rights violations. See, e.g., supra note 49 (discussing cases of disappearances in
Russia). In addition, in a series of cases against Turkey, victims or their family members
have brought claims against the state for applying laws that limit liability to individuals
accused of crimes involving deprivations of life or torture or inhuman and degrading treatment. Such laws include statutes of limitation, provisions for the suspension of sentences,
and a law granting “amnesty” to civil servants in disciplinary matters. (Although the latter
law is termed an amnesty law, it differs significantly in scope, intention and effect than
those that are generally considered in discussions of amnesty.) See, e.g., Yeter v. Turkey,
App. No. 33750/03, ¶ 70 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90598; Ali and Ayse Duran v. Turkey, App. No. 42942/02, ¶ 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 08, 2008), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-85767; Abdulsamet Yaman v. Turkey, App. No. 32446/96, ¶ 55 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 02, 2004), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-67228.
For a similar case in
Romania that also included a challenge to a proposed amnesty law, see Case of Association
“21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania, App. Nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. May 24, 2011), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i
=001-104864.
One of the ECHR’s four cases explicitly involving amnesty laws was brought by a family
member. See Dorado v. Spain, App. No. 30141/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 27, 2012), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110236. The only case
before the European Commission to consider the application of an amnesty law was also
brought by a family member. See Dujardin v. France, App. No. 16734/90, 72 Eur. Comm’n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 236, 241 (1991).
141
One of the decisions was rendered by the European Commission, while the others
were from the European Court. One decision is no longer valid because the Grand Chamber agreed to hear the case under Article 43 of the European Convention, and rendered a
subsequent decision. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 43(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“A panel of five judges of the
Grand Chamber shall accept the request if the case raises a serious question affecting the
interpretation or application of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or a serious issue
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amnesty emerges in each case, the judgments are much more disparate than those of the IACHR, with some decisions accepting the legality of amnesty laws.142
The 2014 Grand Chamber judgment in Margus̆ v. Croatia is the
most recent and authoritative of the European Court jurisprudence
on the matter.143 The applicant, former Croatian military commander Fred Margus̆, challenged his 2007 conviction for war crimes
committed in the early 1990s. Because initial charges brought against
him had been discontinued in 1997 under the application of Croatia’s
General Amnesty Act, he contended his 2007 trial violated his right
against double jeopardy, enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to
the European Convention.144Against the urging of a number of
judges who wrote concurring or partially dissenting opinions to say
that the Grand Chamber’s decision should have been based solely on
the interpretation of Protocol No. 7 (as the lower chamber had done
in ruling against Margus̆), the majority of the Grand Chamber considered whether the amnesty law itself, as applied to the crimes for which
Margus̆ was tried, violated other provisions of the European Convention, namely the right to life and the prohibition of torture found in
of general importance.”). My count of decisions does not include the Turkish cases mentioned in supra note 140 for the reasons discussed therein.
142
Cases that suggest a permissive approach to amnesty are Dujardin (“The State is
justified in adopting, in the context of its criminal policy, any amnesty law it might consider necessary, with the proviso, however, that a balance is maintained between the legitimate interests of the State and the interests of individual members of the public . . . .”)
(regarding French amnesty law in New Caledonia, passed as part of self-determination
agreement) and Tarbuk v. Croatia, App. No. 31360/10, ¶ 50 (Eur. Ct H.R. Dec. 11, 2012),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115166 (upholding Croatia’s right to impose General Amnesty Act and denying claim for monetary compensation for time imprisoned prior to its passage). Decisions finding the application of
amnesty laws to violate the Convention are Ould Dah (“The obligation to prosecute
criminals should not therefore be undermined by granting impunity to the perpetrator in
the form of an amnesty law that may be considered contrary to international law.”) (upholding France’s application of its universal jurisdiction statute to Mauritanian accused of
torture, despite amnesty law in Mauritania covering his acts) and Margus̆ v. Croatia, App.
No. 4455/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 13, 2012); Margus̆ v. Croatia, App. No. 4455/10 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. May 27, 2014) (Grand Chamber) (discussed below).
Because the court ruled that Dorado v. Spain was inadmissible due to failure to demonstrate new information or evidence (¶ 41) or “genuine connection” (¶ 36) between a
Franco era death/disappearance and any ongoing unresolved investigative process, it did
not address the issue whether the Spanish amnesty was in violation of the European
Convention.
143
Margus̆ (Grand Chamber).
144
Id. ¶¶ 139–41. The article Margus̆ claimed was violated reads in part: “No one shall
be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of
the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted
in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol 7, art. 4(1), Nov. 22, 1984,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/
Treaties/html/117.htm. Margus̆ also complained of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, which is not relevant for my analysis here.
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Articles 2 and 3.145 In doing so, it reviewed the state of international
jurisprudence on amnesty laws, looking in depth at the jurisprudence
of the IACHR, including the court’s judgment in El Mozote.146 It cited
that jurisprudence for its “firm[ ] stance” against amnesties,147 one
paragraph before finding that “[a] growing tendency in international
law is to see such amnesties [for grave breaches of fundamental
human rights] as unacceptable because they are incompatible with
the unanimously recognised obligation of States to prosecute and
punish grave breaches of fundamental human rights.”148 It then concluded that, because Croatian authorities were acting in compliance
with their obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the
proscription of double jeopardy in Protocol No. 7 is not applicable.149
Although the Grand Chamber arguably left open the possibility
that amnesties might be permissible in certain circumstances, “such as
a reconciliation process and/or a form of compensation to the victims” (which it found were not present in the case in hand),150 most
of the decision belied that possibility. In fact, the court positively referenced the IACHR’s interpretation of Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions which, as noted earlier, is
controversial among scholars.151 Moreover, the Grand Chamber’s decision to consider Article 2 and 3 arguably sets up future claims by
victims contending that amnesty laws violate states’ duties under those
provisions.
4. The Persistence of Amnesties and of
Human Rights Opposition to Them
Notwithstanding increased condemnation of amnesties and the
attempts by human rights advocates and courts to ameliorate the tensions between justice and truth and justice and peace, both formal
and informal amnesties continue to be granted in much of the
world.152 Even the United Nations, though it had stated it would not
145

Margus̆ (Grand Chamber), ¶¶ 124–28.
Id. ¶¶ 60–66.
147
Id. ¶ 138.
148
Id. ¶ 139.
149
See id. ¶¶ 140–41.
150
Id. ¶ 139.
151
Id. ¶ 131. See supra notes 62, 107 and accompanying text (in part discussing the
Third Party brief submitted in Margus̆ on this point). Shortly after the decision, Fionnuala
Nı́ Aoláin commented: “The density of soft law is hardening on the position that amnesties
should not be granted to persons who have committed such grave violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law.” Fionnuala Nı́ Aoláin, European Court of Human
Rights Rules on Amnesty and Double Jeopardy, JUST SECURITY (June 10, 2014, 10:00 A.M.),
http://justsecurity.org/11112/ecthr-double-jeopardy/ (in part placing the decision in the
context of three other ECHR cases that had considered amnesty).
152
See, e.g., Louise Mallinder, Amnesties’ Challenge to the Global Accountability Norm? Interpreting Regional and International Trends in Amnesty Enactment, in AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF
146
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participate in peace accords that grant amnesty, in fact did so in the
well-known example of the 1999 Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone,
which it later and somewhat embarrassingly repudiated.153
Various explanations have been given for the persistence of
amnesties, including—ironically—that they might be a response to
the increasing threat and trend of prosecution.154 Louise Mallinder
notes, for example, that the number of newly enacted amnesties
peaked in 2003, the year following the beginning of the ICC.155 Their
persistence also suggests that amnesty continues to be a demand of
many parties to negotiated peace agreements, which might explain
why the most recent decisions of the IACHR and ECHR (perhaps with
Colombia and Northern Ireland, respectively, in mind) contain the
recognition that peace processes might call into question absolutist
rules on the prohibition of some forms of amnesty or at least on the
requirement of criminal punishment.
Not only have amnesties continued to appear in peace agreements but even some countries in which amnesty laws were not a direct result of such agreements continue to be reluctant to repeal their
laws. Indeed, both Brazil and Uruguay have in many ways acted in
defiance of the IACHR’s rulings invalidating their amnesty laws.
Perhaps most famously, Brazil has explicitly refused to comply
with the IACHR’s decision in Gomes Lund, relying instead in part on a
2010 decision of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court that upheld the
HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY 80–81, 87–90 (Francesca Lessa & Leigh A. Payne eds.,
2012) (noting that amnesty enactments have persisted globally since 1979, although since
1999, amnesties have been more likely than not to exclude international crimes); see also
TRICIA D. OLSEN, LEIGH A. PAYNE, & ANDREW G. REITER, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE:
COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY 99 (2010) (arguing that an increased focus on
criminal accountability has not been accompanied by a decline in the number of
amnesties).
153
For a discussion of the Lomé agreement, the United Nations’ role in it and in its
repudiation, and the subsequent conflicting decisions by the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court for Sierra Leone as to its legality, see William A.
Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 145 (2004). Since 1999, in instances in which
truth commissions have considered the possibility of granting or recommending amnesties
for serious crimes, the United Nations has explicitly refused to cooperate. PRISCILLA B.
HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 105 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing Timor-Leste and Kenya).
154
See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, The Age of Accountability: The Global Rise of Individual Criminal Accountability, in AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY 21 (Francesca
Lessa & Leigh A. Payne eds., 2012) (suggesting that amnesties may reflect the “growing
influence of international criminal law”); Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under
International Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?,
43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 175 (2002) (arguing that the “increased use of amnesties is . . . less a
reflection of our increased tolerance of impunity and more of an indicator of the growing
force of the international human rights movement and international criminal law”).
155
Mallinder, supra note 152, at 81.
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amnesty law (while the case was still pending before the IACHR).156
As its minister of human rights stated in 2012, Brazil considers the
amnesty law to be part of the “process of national reconciliation” and
it “will not get involved in the debate on the amnesty law, either domestically or at the international level.”157 In October 2014, the
IACHR again criticized Brazil. In a compliance resolution on Gomes
Lund, it reaffirmed that Brazil’s amnesty law is in violation of its international commitments, perpetuating “impunity for grave human
rights violations in open disregard of the decisions of this Court and
international human rights law.”158
Notwithstanding the IACHR’s clear statement in its original decision in Gomes Lund that a truth commission alone would be insufficient to comply with its ruling,159 Brazil established such a commission
in November 2011.160 The truth commission initially generated
mixed responses within the country. Both victims and military officers
referred to it, respectively, as a “sham” and a “threat.”161 Human
156
For detailed discussion of this case, see Fabia Fernandes Carvalho Veçoso, Whose
Exceptionalism? Debating the Inter-American View on Amnesty and the Brazilian Case, in
ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 67.
157
International Justice Desk, Brazil Nixes International Debate of its Amnesty Law, RADIO
NETH. WORLDWIDE (May 22, 2012, 9:49 AM) (on file with author). In Brazil, as in other
countries during times in which amnesty laws existed, there have been attempts to circumvent the amnesty law by initiating prosecutions for ongoing crimes, such as forced disappearance and kidnapping, or other crimes that fall outside the temporal scope of the
amnesty. In March 2012, for example, federal prosecutors in Brazil charged a former colonel, Sebastião Curio Rodrigues de Moura, with aggravated kidnapping. The court initially
dismissed the charges on the grounds that he could not be tried due to the amnesty, but
the court accepted the charges on appeal. See Guerrilha do Araguaia, Justiça Federal Aceita
Denúncia Contra Major Curió, VEJA (Aug. 30, 2012), http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/brasil/
justica-do-para-aceita-denuncia-contra-major-curio. Similar prosecutions have gone forward more recently, despite defendants’ claims that the statute of limitations prevented
them. See Brazil: Panel Details ‘Dirty War’ Atrocities, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 10, 2014), http:/
/www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/10/brazil-panel-details-dirty-war-atrocities (discussing the
cases of Col. Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra and of Alcides Singillo).
158
See Resolución de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de 17 de Octubre de 2014, Caso Gomes Lund y Otros (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) vs. Brasil, Supervisión
de Cumplimiento de Sentencia (par. 19) (Braz.) (“[Brazilian] judicial decisions have interpreted and applied the Amnesty Law of Brazil in a way that continues to compromise the
international responsibility of the State and perpetuate impunity for grave human rights
violations in open disregard of the decisions of this Court and international human rights
law.”) (Sp: “[D]ecisiones judiciales [de Brasil] que interpretan y aplican la Ley de Amnistı́a
del Brasil de una forma que continúa comprometiendo la responsabilidad internacional
del Estado y perpetúa la impunidad de graves violaciones de derechos humanos en franco
desconocimiento de lo decidido por esta Corte y el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos
Humanos.”).
159
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
160
Lei No. 12.528, de 18 de Novembro de 2011, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
11.18.2011 (Braz.).
161
See John Otis, Brazil’s Truth Commission Under Fire from Military and Torture Victims,
PUB. RADIO INT’L (Oct. 30, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.pri.org/stories/2012-10-30/
brazils-truth-commission-under-fire-military-and-torture-victims.
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rights advocates saw it as but one step toward, rather than as a substitute for, prosecutions.162
In December 2014, many human rights advocates were pleasantly
surprised when the truth commission released its final report.163 Not
only did the report increase the numbers of individuals identified as
dead or disappeared but it also named the perpetrators of those
human rights violations.164 And, in its explicit consideration of amnesty, it endorsed the IACHR’s position on amnesty and international
law, calling for the prosecution of those responsible for grave violations of human rights during the twenty-one years of dictatorship.165
The Brazilian government has been supportive of many parts of
the report, with President Roussef stating upon its release that “[w]e
hope this report prevents ghosts from a painful and sorrowful past
from seeking refuge in the shadows of silence and omission.”166 The
current minister of human rights stated that the government has begun to implement twelve of twenty-nine of the truth commission’s recommendations, but that the other seventeen (presumably including
the recommendations on prosecutions), would need to be dealt with
through collaboration between different branches of government.167
Several human rights organizations (from Brazil, Argentina, and the
United States) have since aired the issue at a hearing before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, calling on Brazil to
implement all of the reports’ recommendations. They explicitly
called upon the state to determine the “legal responsibility . . . of the
government agents who caused the serious human rights violations
that occurred in the period investigated” by the truth commission.168
162
See Amnesty Int’l, Brazil: Uncovering the Past; President Dilma Names Truth Commission
Members (May 11, 2012), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/brazil-truth-commissionsignals-long-overdue-justice-past-crimes-2012-05-11 (describing the creation of the Brazilian
truth commission as a “landmark event,” but adding that “the findings of this newly formed
Commission will further the vital efforts of the Public Ministry in initiating criminal prosecutions against suspected past violators”).
163
Relatório Final da Comissão Nacional da Verdade COMISSÁO NACIONAL DA VERDAD (Dec.
10, 2014), available at http://www.cnv.gov.br.
164
Simon Romero, Brazil Releases Report on Past Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/world/americas/torture-report-on-brazilian
-dictatorship-is-released.html.
165
See Relatório Final da Comissão Nacional da Verdade, supra note 163, at 966–67; see also
Romero, supra note 164; Brazil: Panel Details ‘Dirty War’ Atrocities, supra note 157.
166
Romero, supra note 164.
167
Roldão Arruda (in interview with Ideli Salvatti), Governo já Segue Recomendações da
Comissão da Verdade, Afirma Ministra, ESTADÃO (Feb. 4, 2015), http://politica.estadao.com.
br/blogs/roldao-arruda/governo-ja-segue-recomendacoes-da-comissao-da-verdade-afirmaministra/.
168
National Truth Commission in the OAS: Organizations call for the Implementation of Recommendations and Request Monitoring by IACHR, CONECTAS (Mar. 24, 2015), http://
www.conectas.org/en/actions/justice/news/31810-national-truth-commission-in-the-oas.
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In October 2011, after much debate and previous failed attempts,
Uruguay adopted new legislation that effectively repealed its amnesty
law.169 Yet, in February 2013, the Supreme Court struck down part of
the new law as unconstitutional, based on its failure to respect the
statute of limitations for what it labeled common crimes of the dictatorship (versus crimes against humanity) and because of its ex post
facto effect.170 As in Brazil,171 some lower courts have found ways
around the Supreme Court’s ruling,172 but the issue of amnesty continues to be both contentious and unresolved.
In addition, the newly elected president of Uruguay, Tabaré Vázquez, who had also been president between 2005 and 2010, launched
a truth commission on March 1, 2015—his first day in office—to “research and compile a comprehensive work on the crimes committed
by the state during the right-wing military dictatorship (1975-1983),
most notably the forced disappearances of people.”173 Nevertheless,
human rights activists in the country have expressed skepticism about
the commission, claiming that the result could be “a luxurious burial”
of the investigations.174
During these periods of defiance of the IACHR’s decisions, both
Brazil and Uruguay have had presidents who are ex-guerrilla members
and former political prisoners.175 Yet, neither President Rouseff nor
169
Publicada D.O. 1° nov/011 - N° 28340, Ley N° 18.831; Press Release, Cámara de
Representantes, Diputados Aprobo Restablecimiento De La Pretension Punitiva Del Estado
(Oct. 27, 2011), available at http://www0.parlamento.gub.uy/palacio3/scroll2/printscroll
db.asp?IdComunicado=4173&Cuerpo=D.
170
Pierre-Louis Le Goff & Francesca Lessa, Uruguay’s Supreme Court of Injustice, ARG.
INDEP. (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.argentinaindependent.com/socialissues/humanrights
/uruguays-supreme-court-of-injustice/.
171
See supra note 157.
172
For a discussion of the lower court decisions, see Francesca Lessa & Pierre-Louis Le
Goff, ‘Breaking the Wall of Impunity’ in Uruguay, AL JAZEERA (May 6, 2013), http://
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/20135592150620600.html; see also
Francesca Lessa & Pierre-Louis Le Goff, Elusive Justice in Uruguay, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 13,
2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/elusive-justice-uruguay201426154329630301.html.
173
InSerbia Network Foundation, Uruguay: President-Elect Vázquez Announces Dictatorship
Truth Commission, INNEWS (Feb. 19, 2015 12:09 PM), http://inserbia.info/today/2015/02/
uruguay-president-elect-vazquez-announces-dictatorship-truth-commission/.
174
Huidobro Fue el Único Jerarca Silbado en Plena Ceremonia, EL PAIS (Mar. 2, 2015), http:/
/www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/huidobro-unico-jerarca-silbado-ceremonia.html (“The
commission has generated skepticism in those who work on the themes of human rights
because they believe the result could be a ‘luxurious burial’ of the investigations.”) (“esa
comisión genera escepticismo en actores que han trabajado en el tema derechos humanos
por considerar que el resultado puede ser ‘un entierro de lujo’ de las indagatorias.”).
175
Specifically, Uruguay’s immediate past president, José “Pepe” Mujica, is an ex-guerrilla fighter with the Tupamaros and was also incarcerated for his guerilla efforts. See
Simon Romero, After Years in Solitary, an Austere Life as Uruguay’s President, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/world/americas/after-years-in-solitary-anaustere-life-as-uruguays-president.html. Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff is a former guerrilla fighter who was tortured throughout her imprisonment. See Simon Romero, Leader’s
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President Mujica, who preceded (and succeeded) Vázquez, has promoted criminal trials for past abuses.176 In contrast, nearly all human
rights NGOs inside and outside of the countries oppose amnesties because they are seen to facilitate impunity. As one news article stated
with regard to Uruguay, the Supreme Court’s decision and related
developments “were unsurprisingly met by a wave of international
condemnations, including by Amnesty International, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Center for Justice and International Law and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.”177
If human rights NGOs spend an enormous amount of time and
resources in their efforts to repeal amnesty laws in countries like Brazil and Uruguay, those in countries where the laws have long been
repealed continue to spend an inordinate amount of energy prosecuting human rights violators. In Argentina, for example, prosecutions
first began shortly after the fall of the dictatorship in 1983.178 The
passage of the “Full Stop” law at the end of 1986 put an end to investigations and prosecutions, and the “Due Obedience” law of 1987
granted immunity to all members of the military, except those in
positions of command, for crimes committed during their dictatorship.179 Both laws were repealed in 2003, paving the way for prosecutions to begin again.180 Over a decade later, criminal prosecutions
remain an important if not exclusive focus of major human rights orTorture in the ‘70s Stirs Ghosts in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/08/05/world/americas/president-rousseffs-decades-old-torture-detailed.html.
176
Mujica first ran for president at the same time as the 2009 referendum on repeal of
the amnesty law. He is said to have reluctantly supported the referendum, but only at the
end of his campaign. Although he eventually accepted the IACHR’s ruling through an
executive decree and through support of the amnesty law’s legislative repeal, he did so
only after having thwarted initial attempts by the legislature to repeal the law several
months earlier. Jo-Marie Burt et al., Civil Society and the Resurgent Struggle Against Impunity in
Uruguay (1986–2012), 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 306, 318–22 (2013). He also encouraged Uruguayans not to focus on the brutality of the past.
177
Le Goff & Lessa, ‘Breaking the Wall of Impunity’ in Uruguay, supra note 172 (referencing Naciones Unidas Derechos Humanos Oficina del Alto Comisionado, Uruguay:
sentencia de la Suprema Corte sobre ley contra impunidad preocupa seriamente a Alta
Comisionada (Feb. 2013), http://acnudh.org/2013/05/uruguay-decision-de-la-supremacorte-sobre-ley-contra-impunidad-preocupa-a-alta-comisionada/); Center for Justice & International Law, CEJIL Denuncia Sentencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia (Feb. 25, 2013),
https://www.cejil.org/comunicados/cejil-denuncia-sentencia-de-la-suprema-corte-de-justicia; Organización de los Estados Americanos, Anexo al Comunicado de Prensa Emitido al
Culminar el 147 Perı́odo de Sesiones, COMUNICADO DE PRENSA (Apr. 5, 2013), http://
www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2013/023A.asp.
178
Emilio Fermin Mignone et al., Dictatorship on Trial: Prosecution of Human Rights Violations in Argentina, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 118, 118 (1984).
179
Ley de Punto Final, Law No. 23492, Dec. 29, 1986, [XLVII-A] A.D.L.A. 192 (Arg.);
Ley de Obediencia Debida, Law No. 23.521, June 4, 1987, [XLVII-B] A.D.L.A. 1548 (Arg.).
180
For discussion of the “Full Stop” law, its complement, the “Due Obedience” law,
their 2003 repeal, and subsequent developments, see World Report 2012: Argentina, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2012), http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/argentina; see also Christine A.E. Bakker, A Full Stop to Amnesty in Argentina: The Simón Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
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ganizations like Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, Madres de Plaza de Mayo,
and Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos.181 While
other human rights organizations, like Asociación Civil por la
Igualidad y la Justicia and Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales,
might have a broader mandate, they do not appear to disagree on the
question of amnesty or impunity.182
III
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA
Even as some human rights advocates and international and regional institutions began to put pressure on states to prosecute international human rights and humanitarian law violations in domestic
courts, they also recognized that states would not always be able or
willing to do so. As we saw in Part I, there had long been periodic
support for an international criminal court and, with the end of the
Cold War, it became more of a realistic prospect. Thus, when the
United Nations Security Council was unable to agree on military intervention in the former Yugoslavia, it voted in May 1993 to use its Chapter VII powers in an unprecedented way—to establish the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).183
Although controversy ensued over whether the Security Council had
the power to establish such a tribunal,184 many human rights advocates almost immediately claimed it as a human rights project.
1106 (2005) (describing the judicial and legislative downfall of the “Full Stop” law and the
“Due Obedience” law).
181
See, e.g., Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos, Protección otorgada a
Hooft, el Jurado de Enjuiciamiento de Magistrados lo absolvió (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.apdhargentina.org.ar/proteccion-otorgada-a-Hooft-sobre-jurado-de-enjuiciamiento (describing
the assembly’s disgust of recent outcomes in prosecutions against alleged human rights
violators during the last military dictatorship).
182
That said, there are some scholars who are critical of the Argentine Supreme
Court, the IACHR, and the Argentine human rights movement for their “neopunitivism.”
They argue that the prosecutions violate prohibitions against double jeopardy, as well as
other due process rights. See, e.g., Daniel R. Pastor, La Deriva Neopunitivista de Organismos y
Activistas Como Causa del Desprestigio Actual de Los Derechos Humanos, JURA GENTIUM (2006),
http://www.juragentium.org/topics/latina/es/pastor.htm; Nicolás Guzmán, El Neopunitivismo en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación y de la Corte Interamericana
de Derechos Humanos: Un Pronóstico Incierto para el “Ne Bis In Idem” y la Cosa Juzgada, in JURISPRUDENCIA PENAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN 257 (Leonardo G.
Pitlevnik ed., 2008). For a response, see Leonardo Filippini, El Prestigio de los Derechos
Humanos: Respuesta a Daniel Pastor, JURA GENTIUM (2007), http://www.juragentium.org/
topics/latina/es/filippin.htm.
183
See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 827 (May 25, 1993).
184
The ICTY rejected the challenge to its own legality in its first judgment, Prosecutor
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995).
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In fact, the ICTY was established one month before the Vienna
World Conference on Human Rights.185 The conflict in Yugoslavia
and the response of the ICTY had an obvious impact on the conference. Not only did the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action
contain provisions calling for domestic prosecutions and opposing
amnesty but it also promoted the development of international criminal institutions, “stress[ing] that all persons who perpetrate or authorize criminal acts associated with ethnic cleansing are individually
responsible and accountable for such human rights violations, and
that the international community should exert every effort to bring
those legally responsible for such violations to justice.”186 Further, it
“encourage[d] the International Law Commission to continue its
work on an international criminal court.”187
Notwithstanding the alignment in Vienna between human rights
and international criminal institutions, Amnesty International—in
line with its concerns for due process and its long-term interest in the
rights of those imprisoned—expressed some initial reservations about
the ICTY. It soon made clear, however, that the tribunal matched AI’s
“fundamental aims” to “have the full truth made known about violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and to end impunity for
the perpetrators.”188 AI thereby articulated a relatively early view of
the position that truth and justice are reconcilable. Still, AI saw the
tribunal as a “stopgap” measure, and called for a commitment to a
permanent international criminal tribunal to end impunity.189 It supported the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) a little over a year later on the same basis—as a step
185
See supra note 183; see also United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, World Conference on Human Rights, 14-25 June 1993, Vienna,
Austria, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ABOUTUS/Pages/ViennaWC.aspx (last visited May
15, 2015).
186
Vienna Declaration, supra note 50, ¶ II-23. At another point, it expressed “dismay at
massive violations of human rights especially in the form of genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing’
and systematic rape of women in war situations” and “reiterate[d] the call that perpetrators
of such crimes be punished and such practices immediately stopped.” Id. ¶ I-28.
187
Id. ¶ II-92.
188
Amnesty Int’l, Weekly Update Service (Nov. 15, 1993), https://www.amnesty.org/
download/Documents/188000/nws110151993en.pdf; see also Amnesty Int’l, Former Yugoslavia: Moving Forward to Set Up the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, at 7,
AI Index EUR 48/03/93 (Apr. 30, 1993), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
info/EUR48/003/1993/en (“The war crimes Tribunal could be one step towards breaking
the cycle of impunity and gross human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia, but only
if it is taken seriously by governments and the U.N. There is still a real danger that this
initiative will be no more than an empty political gesture. Amnesty International will continue its work to ensure that the Tribunal actually prosecutes and convicts perpetrators of
gross human rights violations and rigorously complies with all internationally accepted
standards for fairness and justice.”).
189
Amnesty Int’l, Moving Forward to Set Up the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 188, at 7.
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on the way to the ICC. Apparently satisfied with the procedural fairness guarantees of the institutions, it continued to encourage the development of international criminal law, including the ratification of
the Rome Statute and the referral of cases to the ICC.190
AI was not alone among human rights NGOs in its support of an
international criminal tribunal for Rwanda. In its 1994 extensive report on the Rwandan genocide, written before the Security Council
passed the resolution establishing the ICTR, human rights NGO African Rights called for the need to “put the culture of impunity on
trial.”191 The centrality of international criminal law to the fight
against impunity was made clear by 1998, with the adoption of the
Rome Statute establishing the ICC.192 The preamble states that the
ICC’s goal is “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” who
commit “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”193
Even though AI early on expressed due process concerns about
international criminal tribunals and offered a justification for them
based on the facilitation of truth through criminal justice mechanisms, the truth, peace, forgiveness, and justice debates did not generally make their way into the discourse around the development of
international criminal institutions. In fact, international criminal
tribunals were often seen as a way to avoid at least the peace concerns
engendered by the prospect of domestic trials. Recall, for example,
that Carlos Nino preferred the creation of an international criminal
court to the implementation of a legal duty on transitional governments to prosecute their previous regimes.194 The latter, he contended, “is too blunt an instrument to help successor governments
who must struggle with the subtle complexities of re-establishing democracy.”195 He also believed that “[v]iolations of human rights belong with crimes such as terrorism, narcotics-trafficking, and
destabilizing democratic governments, in a category of deeds which
may, because of their magnitude, exceed the capacity of national
courts to handle internally.”196
While the ICTY and ICTR were given primary jurisdiction over
the crimes they cover, the ICC was established to be “complementary
190
See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, The International Criminal Court Fact Sheet 2: The Case for
Ratification, AI Index IOR 40/03/00 (July 31, 2000), available at https://www.amnesty
.org/en/documents/IOR40/003/2000/en/.
191
AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIANCE 724 (1994).
192
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 18.
193
Id. at pmbl.
194
Nino, supra note 11, at 2638–39.
195
Id. at 2638.
196
Id.
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to national criminal jurisdictions.”197 That is, cases involving the same
conduct that has been or is being investigated or prosecuted at the
domestic level are inadmissible unless the state in which the investigation took place is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”198 Many scholars and practitioners have
read complementarity as a means for the ICC to put pressure on states
to prosecute human rights violations, which they generally see as a
positive aspect of the court.199 To the extent that it does exert such
pressure, however, I would contend that it faces some of the issues
that have resulted from similar pressure by human rights courts. That
is, it relies on the criminal apparatus of the same regime that has enabled, if not directed, the actions of the perpetrators who were themselves a part of the state. It also potentially works against the goals of
recently transitioned governments who are reluctant to prosecute for
fear of upsetting a fragile peace.200 Still, most of the attention on the
197
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 18, art. 1 (providing
that the court “shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred
to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”).
198
Id. art. 17(1)(a). Article 17(1)(b) applies the same exception to cases where states
have investigated but not prosecuted due to unwillingness or inability. Article 17(1)(c)
excepts those cases in which the individual has been tried, but in which the proceedings
were conducted for the purpose of shielding the individual from international criminal
responsibility or in a way that was otherwise inconsistent with bringing the person to justice. Id. arts. 17(1)(c), 20(3). For arguments that Article 17 is often misread and misunderstood in general pronouncements about the meaning of complementarity, see Sarah
M.H. Nouwen, Fine-tuning Complementarity, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 206 (Bartram S. Brown ed., 2011); Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 CRIM. L.F. 67 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1559403.
199
See, e.g., JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS (2008) (analyzing the extent to which the ICC encourages states
to develop legislative frameworks that satisfy the complementarity requirements of the
Rome Statute); William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal
Court and National Courts in the Rome System of Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2008) (identifying “proactive complementarity”—the ability of the ICC to encourage states to prosecute
international crimes—as a possible solution to the limited resources and capacity of the
ICC). Whether and how the ICC has in fact served as a catalyst to increased domestic
prosecution requires a complex country-specific analysis, as Sarah Nouwen has demonstrated. See SARAH NOUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND SUDAN (2013).
200
Sometimes, of course, the new regime is more than happy to punish past perpetrators, in which case how it does so could potentially become a matter of international
human rights law. The ICC has dealt with that issue in the admissibility hearings regarding
the prosecution of Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, before the ICC. See Prosecutor v. Saif
Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the
Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ¶ 138 (May 31, 2013), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf. Citing concerns about due process and the
type of proceeding Gaddafi would receive in Libya, his defense attorney argued (against
Libya and, somewhat surprisingly, the ICC Prosecutor) that the case was properly before
the Court even if Libya was willing or able to prosecute. Id. ¶¶ 66–70, 90–101. The PreTrial Chamber found the case admissible and reinstated Libya’s obligation to surrender
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ICC is not about its potential effects on domestic prosecutions but
about the work it does once it exercises jurisdiction.
In considering investigations and prosecutions of the international tribunals and the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction, human rights
advocates have at times been critical of the inner workings of the
tribunals and courts. Yet, the primary criticism is that prosecutors or
judges have not gone far enough. Advocates question, for example,
decisions to omit or reject certain charges or the use of prosecutorial
discretion.201 With regard to the latter, human rights advocates and
scholars alike sometimes express concern that prosecutors—who are
meant to be allied with the fight against impunity—engage in selective
(and what is seen as political) prosecution.202 This issue often
emerges in the context of the ICC, with human rights advocates
calling for addressing selectivity by increasing the number and geographical sites of prosecutions—by indicting someone from outside
Africa, most notably.203
Gaddafi. Id. ¶ 219. In doing so, it avoided the due process issue and Libya’s argument that
the ICC should not become a “human rights court,” by concluding, in part, that Libya had
failed to establish that its domestic proceedings focused on “‘substantially the same conduct and series of events as the ICC case,’” as required by the statute. Id. ¶¶ 65, 88, 195. It
also found that Libya was unable “genuinely to investigate and prosecute the case.” Id. ¶¶
135, 138, 218. On May 21, 2014, the Appeals Chamber affirmed. See Prosecutor v. Saif
Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA, 4, Judgment on
the Appeal of Libya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled
“Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi,” ¶¶ 213–14 (May
21, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1779877.pdf.
201
Human rights advocates expressed concern, for example, over the narrow scope of
charges brought at the ICC against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who was eventually convicted
of the conscription of child soldiers. See Joint Letter from Human Rights Watch et al. to
Luis Moreno Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.hrw.org/news/
2006/07/31/dr-congo-icc-charges-raise-concern. After the first pretrial hearing to confirm
the charges that had been brought against Lubanga, they criticized the court for not including charges for murder, torture and sexual violence. Id. Similarly, the Democratic
Republic of Congo Association of Defense of Human Rights described the charges as “feeble when compared to the crimes committed.” DRC: ICC Begins Hearings in Case Against
Militia Leader, INTEGRATED REG’L INFO. NETWORKS (IRIN) (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.irin
news.org/report/61518/drc-icc-begins-hearings-in-case-against-militia-leader.
202
See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Victor’s Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International
Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 549–50 (2010) (arguing ICC selectivity is inherently political); Joint Letter from Human Rights Watch et al. to Luis Moreno Ocampo,
Chief Prosecutor, ICC, supra note 201; Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutor
Without Borders, WORLD AFF. (Spring 2009), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/
case-closed-prosecutor-without-borders (noting concern among Africans that the ICC “may
be turning criminal prosecution into a selective political instrument”). For discussion of
the Rome Conference debate on prosecutorial discretion, see Alexander K.A. Greenawalt,
Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 583, 590–93 (2007).
203
For an example of this position, see Human Rights Watch’s report on the tenth
anniversary of the court in 2012, which is aptly titled “Unfinished Business.” HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: CLOSING GAPS IN THE SELECTION OF ICC CASES 46–47
(2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/icc0911webwcover.
pdf.
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I do not mean to suggest that no one has offered more fundamental critiques of international criminal law. To the contrary, some
international relations scholars have contended that international
criminal law—whether through international institutions or the assertion of universal jurisdiction—often fails to attend to realpolitik interests.204 And both traditional and critical public international law
scholars have argued that international courts or the institutions supporting them have under or over reached in a variety of ways.205
My concern is that these scholarly critiques have had little impact
on the practice of human rights advocates. In a piece describing what
she calls “[t]he tragedy of international criminal justice activists,”
Sarah Nouwen contends that for many advocates who have equated
criminal prosecutions and justice, the distributional consequences
that some critics have delineated are considered to be largely beside
the point.206 That is, the activists respond to the idea that their good
intentions might cause harm by insisting that “justice must be done
irrespective of its consequences.”207 Similarly, Samuel Moyn discusses
how, in the face of criticism, supporters of the ICC often refuse to
provide explicit justifications for their institution, often assuming that
doing “something” is better than doing “nothing.”208 While these
representations of disregard for consequences are undoubtedly accurate for some, I believe that a more common approach is to deny such
consequences altogether. The Kampala Declaration’s statement that
peace and justice are complimentary,209 for example, attempts to
204
See, e.g., Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in
Strategies of International Justice, INT’L SECURITY 5, 5 (Winter 2003/04) (“[A] strategy that
many [human rights NGOS] favor for achieving this goal—the prosecution of perpetrators
of atrocities according to universal standards—risks causing more atrocities than it would
prevent, because it pays insufficient attention to political realities.”).
205
For a critical, third world approach, see Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World
Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 77 (2003) (criticizing the ICTY for its imposition by the Security Council, for its
unwillingness to consider NATO actions in Kosovo, and for its undemocratic expansion of
international criminal law doctrine). For a list of sources that “touch upon or approach
international criminal law from a critical perspective,” see Bibliography, CRITICAL APPROACHES TO INT’L CRIM. L. RES. NETWORK, http://www.caicl.net/bibliography/ (last visited May 15, 2015).
206
Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Justifying Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 327, 337 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012).
207
Id. at 338.
208
Samuel Moyn, Towards Instrumentalism at the International Criminal Court, 39 YALE J.
INT’L L. ONLINE 55, 60 (2014). Frédéric Mégret made a similar argument over a decade
ago at a much earlier point in the ICC’s history, when he noted that “[p]roponents of a
strong ICC often seem to join arguments with the moral fervour of the neophyte, at times
providing no better reason as to why the ICC might come into being than the fact that it
should.” Frédéric Mégret, Three Dangers for the International Criminal Court: A Critical Look at
a Consensual Project, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 193, 194 (2001).
209
See Kampala Declaration, supra note 124, at pmbl., discussed supra at text accompanying note 124.
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ameliorate the tension between peace and justice precisely so as not to
have to articulate a choice between the two. The same could be said
of much of the IACHR’s jurisprudence, particularly with regard to its
reconciliation of truth and justice.
Whether through the denial of adverse consequences or of their
significance to justice, the correspondence between criminal prosecution and human rights has become so ingrained that expressing opposition to any particular international prosecution is sometimes seen as
anti-human rights. Early discussions over whether the United Nations
Security Council should refer the case of Syria to the ICC reflected
this dynamic. In January 2013, over fifty countries signed a letter
penned by the Swiss government to the Security Council that, while
recognizing international criminal jurisdiction as complementary, encouraged the Security Council to address the failure of Syria to exercise its national responsibility to ensure accountability for crimes
against humanity. The letter called upon “the Security Council to act
by referring the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic as of March
2011 to the International Criminal Court (ICC) without exceptions
and irrespective of the alleged perpetrators.”210 Sweden was the only
European Union (EU) country that did not sign the letter, apparently
for pragmatic reasons.211 As the country’s foreign minister explained:
“It would put Assad in a headlock and make him less flexible, because
we’d be telling him ‘your only option is to fight to the death.’ ”212
Reinforcing Nouwen’s observation that there is no space for
pro-justice advocates to attend to such potential consequences,
Human Rights Watch’s spokesperson in the EU responded to Sweden’s failure to sign the letter by calling it “a sad day for Swedish foreign policy.”213 The lead to a story written in a Swedish newspaper
about the decision began: “Sweden was the lone EU member state to
opt out of [the] petition . . . disappointing human rights observers
who claim the move is ‘un-Swedish.’ ”214 The story went on to interview members of different parties, with the foreign affairs spokesperson of the Christian Democrats making clear the connection between
being Swedish, pro-human rights, and pro-international prosecution:
“Of course Sweden should be exerting pressure. We usually fly the
flag for human rights.”215 The Swedish example demonstrates a criti210
Letter from Thomas Gürber, Deputy Permanent Rep., Permanent Mission of Switz.
to the U.N., to Mohammad Massod Khan, President of U.N. Sec. Council 2 (Jan. 14, 2013),
http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/29293.pdf.
211
See id. at 1.
212
Sweden Rules Out Taking Syria’s Assad to the ICC, LOCAL (Jan. 16, 2013), http://
www.thelocal.se/45642/20130116.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
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cal change: Debates over the value and consequences of, or alternatives to, prosecution no longer take place within the human rights
movement. Instead, advocates have come to see human rights as incompatible with a reluctance to pursue an aggressive anti-impunity
stance through criminal justice mechanisms.
IV
CONCERNS ABOUT

THE

TREND

The purpose of this Article thus far has been to identify, describe,
and understand some of the reasons for the criminal turn in human
rights law and advocacy. I have aimed to demonstrate in particular
how the IACHR and the United Nations have attempted to mediate
the justice versus truth and peace debates and have bolstered their
anti-impunity stance in the process. I also have hoped to show more
generally the ways in which the human rights movement has become
aligned with the prosecutorial side of international and domestic
criminal law.
Clearly the human rights movement has been engaged in other
types of work over the same years that it has become invested in
anti-impunity rhetoric and activity. Yet, the fight against the culture of
impunity—with impunity narrowly defined as foreclosing the option
of criminal punishment—has not only taken up a significant amount
of the human rights movement’s space; it has helped shape the direction of human rights advocacy as well as both international human
rights and international criminal law.
While some might disagree with my assessment of the trajectory
of the human rights movement, others would likely agree with the
analysis but nevertheless contend that the correspondence between
anti-impunity, criminal law, and human rights is a positive development. Indeed, as we have seen, many have argued that the international legal recognition of a duty to prosecute at the domestic level
and the expansion of international criminal institutions have marked
huge progress for human rights and humanitarian law (even as they
have blurred—or perhaps attempted to harmonize—the two fields,
sometimes quite intentionally as in El Mozote). Human rights law and
humanitarian law are at last seen as enforceable.
As my description of the trend has already suggested, I have serious misgivings about the criminal turn. I am concerned not only
about the significant time and resources that have gone into building
criminal institutions but also about how the existence of international
criminal institutions and the possibility of, even demand for, domestic
prosecutions have helped shape and limit human rights aspirations. I
sketch below some of my critiques around four main themes: individualization and decontextualization, conceptions of economic harm and
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remedy, alignment with the state, and the production of history.
Some are aimed at ways in which the turn to criminal law changes the
movement in negative ways, while others show how it reinforces preexisting biases within the human rights system.
A. Individualization and Decontextualization
The criminal law lens often reveals a simple picture of a world
infused with a few bad actors, even monsters. Hannah Arendt
brought this danger to our attention long ago: We convince ourselves
that if we remove the bad actors, we deal with evil.216 That view affects
the human rights movement’s understanding of the world and affects
its strategies and ability to attend to underlying structural causes of
human rights violations. In obscuring state responsibility, it misses the
ways in which bureaucracy functions—even through individual actors—to perpetuate human rights violations. It also misses the multiple ways in which even well-meaning people act both criminally and
noncriminally, inside and outside of state structures, to produce and
reproduce injustice.
Martti Koskenniemi argues that international criminal law’s individualization, and the depoliticization that comes with it, is deliberate.
Referencing the chief prosecutor’s explicit statement that only the individual, not the Serb nation, was on trial in the case against Slobodan
Milos̆evic at the ICTY, he contends that “[t]he effort to end the ‘culture of impunity’ emerges from an interpretation of the past—the
Cold War in particular—as an unacceptably political approach to international crises.”217 This refusal to take into account context, however, distorts the very search for “truth” on which human rights
advocates base their defense of the trials. As Koskenniemi puts it, “the
meaning of historical events often . . . can be grasped only by attention to structural causes, such as economic or functional necessities,
or a broad institutional logic through which the actions by individuals
create social effects.”218
Individualization not only narrows historical inquiry and downplays the role of the state but it also “may even serve as an alibi for the
population at large to relieve itself from responsibility.”219 Robert
Meister argues that the same logic applies to the human rights
216
See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1963). For a similar but more contemporary argument, see Vasuki Nesiah, The Specter of
Violence that Haunts the UDHR: The Turn to Ethics and Expertise, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 135 (2009).
217
Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1,
13 (2002). He continues: “Indeed, this is precisely what the Prosecutor in the Milosevic
trial, Carla del Ponte, said she was doing in The Hague in February 2002. The (Serb)
nation was not on trial, only an individual was.” Id.
218
Id. at 13–14.
219
Id. at 14.
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movement itself, which, due to its focus on evil and its sense that it has
accomplished justice, fails to see the ways in which it and those with
whom it aligns are often complicit in creating and continuing conditions of gross structural inequality.220
Both a cause and manifestation of decontextualization and depoliticization is that international human rights and humanitarian law
increasingly treat state and nonstate actors to a given conflict alike.
The primary issue often becomes which side has committed what
atrocities, without concern for the cause of the conflict or its ideological content. Nearly every armed conflict today involves what we might
term “human rights-fare,” with each side accusing the other of atrocities worthy of international attention, if not intervention. To respond,
human rights advocates must often deny any political position with
regard to the conflict.221
Of course, that human rights advocates do not claim to take a
political position does not mean that they do not. When they push to
indict and obtain custody of certain leaders or, as in Kenya, even of
candidates for office,222 they play a significant role in the politics of
the country. They also problematically side with governments, such as
with Uganda in the case of the Kony indictment and other self-referrals by states.223 And, as already suggested, they often refuse to consider seriously the ways in which the exertion of power by
220

See generally ROBERT MEISTER, AFTER EVIL: A POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2011).
This dynamic has been seen in the various disclosures and debates about atrocities
committed by both sides in Syria. Even before the 2013 chemical weapons attacks, AI began to chronicle, based on interviews and video evidence, alleged war crimes committed by
armed opposition groups in Syria. It then called upon those groups to stop all human
rights violations, upon governments to condemn such violations and upon the United Nations Security Council to refer the situation to the ICC. See Amnesty Int’l, Syria: Summary
Killings and Other Abuses by Armed Opposition Groups, AI Index MDE 24/008/2013 (Mar. 14,
2013), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/summary_killings_by_armed_opposi
tion_groups.pdf. Both the reporting of abuses and the call for the situation to be referred
to the ICC to consider crimes on all sides allowed for, even required, claims of neutrality.
222
During the March 2013 elections, both Kenyan Presidential candidate Uhuru
Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto had been indicted by the ICC. For an analysis of the likely impact of the indictments on the election from February of that year, see
Gabrielle Lynch & Mis̆a Zgonec-Rožej, The ICC Intervention in Kenya (Feb. 2013), http://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/
0213pp_icc_kenya.pdf. On December 5, 2014, the ICC prosecutor withdrew the charges
against Kenyatta. See Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11,
Notice of Withdrawal of the Charges Against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1879204.pdf
223
In addition to advocating for the indictment of Kony, whose name gained international recognition after a video titled Kony 2012 went viral, human rights activists have
been working with the Ugandan military to attempt to capture him. See Elizabeth Rubin,
How a Texas Philanthropist Helped Fund the Hunt for Joseph Kony, NEW YORKER (Oct. 21, 2013),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-a-texas-philanthropisthelped-fund-the-hunt-for-joseph-kony.
221
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international criminal institutions might block other political
solutions.
As the political context gets lost, domestic and international attention often turn to questions of how to make war more humane,
rather than how to prevent it or respond to underlying inequities that
might lead to it. Jus ad bellum has thus taken a backseat to jus in
bello.224 More importantly, perhaps, attention is deflected away from
an analysis of the multiple ways in which the global north is complicit
in military conflict in the global south. The United States, for example, has been and continues to be the primary supplier of arms to
numerous governments involved in ongoing conflicts.225
B. Conceptions of Economic Harm and Remedy
Advocates of economic and social rights have often challenged
the dominance of civil and political rights within human rights law
and advocacy. For years, they have pushed to make economic and
social rights more justiciable at the domestic and international levels,
with mixed success.226 Many now often concentrate their efforts on
holding corporations criminally or civilly liable, as the slate of cases
against corporations in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute
attests.227 Even though their goal might sometimes be to weaken cor224
For a comparison of international legal challenges to United States atrocities committed during the Vietnam War and those committed during the war on terror, the former
based on jus ad bellum and the latter on jus in bello, see Samuel Moyn, From Antiwar Politics
to Antitorture Politics (Nov. 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pa
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966231. This perspective is in contrast to
that voiced by a number of scholars shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq,
when it seemed there was a new turn to jus ad bellum justifications for war. See, e.g., Steven
R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 905 (2002).
225
See, e.g., RICHARD F. GRIMMETT & PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42678,
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 2004-2011, at 2–4 (2012) (noting that the developing world [defined as including countries in Asia, the Near East, Latin
America, and Africa while excluding the United States, Russia, European nations, Canada,
Japan, New Zealand and Australia] is the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity and
that, as of 2011, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with and arms
deliveries to developing countries).
226
For an analysis of the effects of justiciable education and health rights in a variety
of domestic courts around the world, see COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Varun Gauri & Daniel M.
Brinks eds., 2008).
227
Arguably, the United States Supreme Court ruling for the defendants in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) might lead to more, rather than fewer,
attempts to hold corporations accountable in criminal or tort law. Global Diligence, a
group of international criminal lawyers who advise corporations on human rights risk,
wrote the following shortly after the decision:
What the Kiobel ruling does not do is to de-rail the entire business and
human rights movement. . . . On the contrary, victim groups and NGOs are
likely to re-double their efforts in seeking to hold businesses accountable.
Within the U.S., class action trial lawyers will continue to push cases of alleged corporate complicity in human rights violations overseas. . . . Other
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porate power so as to protect a broad range of rights, they often state
their claims in terms of civil and political rights so as to make them
more justiciable or more publicly compelling.228
The turn to criminal law in this context arguably perpetuates biases against economic restructuring already inherent in the human
rights framework. Regardless of the extent to which economic and
social rights are justiciable, they are still pursued within a neoliberal
system. Given that neoliberalism depends upon and reinforces criminal law, in part to protect private property rights, the cards are stacked
against any attempt to use criminal law to challenge neoliberalism.
The aim of advocates is therefore to prevent excesses, rather than to
restructure. They do not, for example, focus on changing property,
contract, corporate, or tax law in their efforts reduce corporate power.
It is also difficult to pursue economic reparations in the criminal
justice context. For many years, economic reparations were seen as an
alternative, or at least supplement, to criminal justice. The former
tended to be the domain of truth and reconciliation commissions
while criminal legal institutions were exclusively punitive. As criminal
institutions began to be seen as necessary to transition, those who argued for reparations often pushed for courts to be able to award
them. They achieved some success with the inclusion of a provision in
victims will undoubtedly be dissuaded from launching an action in the U.S.
courts, but they will look to other jurisdictions for satisfaction. The courts
of certain European countries–such as the U.K., France and the Netherlands–may be more receptive to hearing claims of corporate complicity in
extra-territorial human rights violations . . . . There may also be further
pressure on the International Criminal Court to hold senior company executives accountable for complicity in international crimes where there is
credible evidence to do so . . . although extending the jurisdiction of the
ICC to legal as well as natural persons does not appear likely in the immediate future.
Alex Batesmith, The Kiobel Ruling: Big Business Wins the Battle but Not the War—and How All
Companies Will Be Under Increasing Scrutiny in the Future, GLOBAL DILIGENCE (Apr. 19, 2013),
http://www.globaldiligence.com/the-kiobel-ruling-big-business-wins-the-battle-but-not-thewar-and-how-all-companies-will-be-under-increasing-scrutiny-in-the-future.
228
Consider two cases involving Shell Oil’s exploitation of oil reserves in Ogoniland,
one against the corporation under the United States’ Alien Tort Statute and the other
against the state of Nigeria under the African Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Compare Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (“Petitioners, Nigerian nationals residing in the United
States, filed suit in federal court under the Alien Tort Statute . . . .”), with The Social and
Econ. Rights Action Ctr. & the Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, African Comm’n
on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001) (“The communication alleges
that the military government of Nigeria . . . caused environmental degradation and health
problems resulting from the contamination of the environment among the Ogoni People.”). Even though the latter case was brought intentionally to highlight the economic
impact of the activities of Shell and the Nigerian-owned oil company in the region (given
that economic and social rights are included in the African Commission’s jurisdiction), the
plaintiffs and the commission alike arguably emphasized the civil and political rights violations by the Nigerian military against those who protested Shell’s activities. See The Social
and Economic Rights Action Center, ¶ 10.
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the Rome Statute that allows the ICC to issue reparations that include
financial compensation.229 While economic remedies are important
for most victims, their award is generally dependent upon a finding of
guilt and a proven “ ‘but/for’ relationship between the crime and the
harm.”230 Given the selectivity of criminal prosecutions, granting of
these types of reparations is relatively arbitrary. Moreover, although
the court lists the return of “lost or stolen property” as a possible form
of reparation,231 the remedy leaves little room for the significant redistribution of property that might be needed to attend to long-standing
inequalities.232
C. Alignment with the State
When local human rights NGOs spend time and resources promoting prosecutions, they often align themselves with the state. From
feminists advocating for the enforcement of antitrafficking legislation
to indigenous groups helping to strategize and participate in the prosecution of former military leaders who targeted them for extermination, human rights advocates are often dependent upon the very
police, prosecutorial, and even adjudicatory apparatuses of which they
have long had reason to be suspicious.
Human rights advocates also participate in the governance of the
state when their advocacy encourages states to overreach in their investigations, prosecutions, and punishments. As Frédéric Mégret and
Jean-Paul S. Calderón have noted in a recent piece on the neopunitivism they see in the jurisprudence of the IACHR, “[t]here will inevitably be cases where responsibilities cannot be identified, a case beyond
reasonable doubt cannot be mounted, or suspects cannot be appre229
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 18, art. 75. For further elaboration of the conditions for and types of reparations (including collective as well
as individual), see Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, ICC-ASP/1/3, rule 97(1),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/Documents/RPE.4th.ENG.08Feb1200.pdf; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to
be Applied to Reparations (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1447971.pdf.
230
Lubanga Dyilo, ¶ 250. That said, the Rome Statute also established a Trust Fund for
Victims. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 18, art. 79. In addition to its mandate to implement ICC reparations awards, it also has an “assistance mandate.” Under the latter mandate, it can use resources from private donations and
voluntary contributions to “provide victims under Court jurisdiction with physical rehabilitation, psychological rehabilitation, and/or material support.” The Two Roles of the TFV,
TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/two-roles-tfv (last visited
May 15, 2015).
231
Lubanga Dyilo, ¶ 224.
232
For a discussion of the failure of reparations to address land inequality in the context of reparations awarded by domestic courts in Rwanda, see Zinaida Miller, Effects of
Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 266,
279–80 (2008).
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hended.”233 They express a concern I share that “[t]o suggest that
these cases manifest a failure of the state to comply with its duty to
offer a remedy could quickly lead to a culture of ‘results’ that could
have catastrophic consequences for the rights soundness of the criminal justice system.”234
An example of such a focus on results can be seen in the Mexican
government’s response to international pressure mounted on it to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the murders of women
in Ciudad Juárez. The state falsely arrested, detained, and tortured a
number of individuals, many of whom lacked the resources to challenge the accusations against them.235 A 2005 study of femicides in
Mexico by the Latin American Working Group Education Fund
(LAWGEF) reported strong evidence for false imprisonment in approximately one-sixth, and the use of physical or psychological torture
to coerce confessions in nearly one-half, of the murder cases in which
the state had detained a suspect.236 Given Mexico’s widespread use of
pretrial detention237 and its practice of considering a femicide case
“resolved” for official reporting purposes once a suspect is in custody,238 wrongful arrest and detention offer a particularly expedient
means for officials to alleviate concerns surrounding impunity for
human rights violations.
This concern about overreach is not only about penal systems
that do not meet formal rule of law requirements. As discussed in
Part I, many penal systems in the world have undergone a neoliberal
makeover—often as a direct result of explicit exportation of United
States criminal justice, aimed largely at transnational crime.239 That
criminal justice project has favored large-scale incarceration and eschewed criminal justice reform initiatives—from carceral abolition to

233

Frédéric Mégret and Jean-Paul S. Calderón, supra note 29, at 18.
Id.
235
See SEAN MARIANO GARCÍA, SCAPEGOATS OF JUÁREZ: THE MISUSE OF JUSTICE IN PROSECUTING WOMEN’S MURDERS IN CHIHUAHUA, MEXICO (2005).
236
Id. at 12 (citing Informe Especial de la Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos Sobre
los Casos de Homicidios Y Desapariciones de Mujeres en el Municipio de Juárez, Chihuahua COMISION NACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (1998), http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/
fuentes/documentos/informes/especiales/2003_HomicidioDesapariciones.pdf).
237
GUILLERMO ZEPEDA LECUONA, LOS MITOS DE LA PRISIÓN PREVENTATIVA EN MÉXICO
(2d ed. 2010), available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/myths-pretrialdetention-mexico (showing that more than forty percent of all suspects are incarcerated
while awaiting trial, and contesting the reasons commonly given for such detention);
Richard M. Aborn & Ashley D. Cannon, Prisons: In Jail, But Not Sentenced, AM. Q. (Winter
2013), http://www.americasquarterly.org/aborn-prisons (showing country-by-country pretrial detention rates in the Americas, and assessing their cost).
238
GARCÍA, supra note 235, at 13.
239
See generally McLeod, supra note 20.
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restorative justice.240 Thus, at the same time that “justice” came to
mean “criminal justice” in human rights advocacy, “criminal justice”
largely came to mean incarceration in the United States and in its
exported models. The possibility for imagining alternatives has therefore arguably been eroded at two different levels.
The alignment of human rights advocates with the carceral state
cannot help but affect the extent to which the human rights movement is able to mount a serious criticism of mass and brutal incarceration and the biases we see in nearly every penal system in the world.
Moreover, advocates might be less likely in general to be critical of
governments that seem finally to be attempting to remedy past
wrongs, even if through the penal system. In line with several of the
previously stated concerns, advocates might also begin to conceive of
the broader issues they promote as criminal issues, as though their
victories in punishing a few bad actors could address centuries of biases based on race, class, and gender, thus relieving pressure on the
state to attend to structural issues of distribution.
D. The Production of History
With institutional resources focused on anti-impunity, anti-impunity often becomes the primary objective for the collection of documents, archives, and video. Increasingly, archival materials are
collected with their relevance for criminal trials in mind.241 Beginning with Hannah Arendt, a number of scholars have criticized the
use of criminal trials to narrate history.242 My concern here is slightly
different, though. If the collection and preservation of the historical
record is guided by its legal admissibility or relevance, much of the
story might be lost.243
Criminalization also affects the issue of access to more general
archives that already exist. Those in control of such archives might be
less forthcoming in collecting incriminating materials or in granting
240
For some of McLeod’s imagined alternatives, see Allegra M. McLeod, Confronting
Criminal Law’s Violence: The Possibilities of Unfinished Alternatives, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL
LEFT 109 (2013).
241
For an example of the ways such concerns about admissibility and relevance are
addressed, see KATHLEEN O’NEILL, DELLA SENTILLES & DANIEL M. BRINKS, NEW WINE IN OLD
WINESKINS? NEW PROBLEMS IN THE USE OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS, available at http://www.crl.edu/sites/default/files/attach
ments/pages/Rapoport-E-evidence-report.pdf.
242
See ARENDT, supra note 216. For a contemporary discussion of the crafting of historical narrative through international criminal trials, see RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, WRITING
HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS (2011).
243
Of course it could be argued that the focus on criminal trials has led to increased
funding for preserving archival materials so that, even if limited, at least records are kept.
Moreover, even archives that are limited to legally relevant materials have proven useful to
historians. See, e.g., Robert M. W. Kempner, Review, The Nuremberg Trials as Sources of Recent
German Political and Historical Materials, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 447 (1950).
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access to those materials if they believe they might be used for criminal prosecution or even civil claims. They might thereby forego
“truth” in order to avoid liability.244
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have both shown and questioned the human
rights movement’s attachment to the fight against impunity and its
uses of criminal law in the process. I have taken a position against a
strong anti-impunity focus, with a critical look at the implications of
connecting human rights remedies to criminal law. Being against
anti-impunity is not the same as being for impunity. Rather, my anti
anti-impunity stance is much like the “anti anti-relativism” proposed
by Clifford Geertz in his famous 1984 lecture. I quote from that lecture below, replacing “cultural relativism” with “impunity”:
A scholar can hardly be better employed than in destroying a fear.
The one I want to go after is [cultural relativism impunity]. Not the
thing itself, which I think merely there, like Transylvania, but the
dread of it, which I think unfounded. . . . To be more specific, I
want not to defend [relativism impunity], which is a drained
term anyway, yesterday’s battle cry, but to attack [anti-relativism
anti-impunity], which seems to me broadly on the rise and to represent a streamlined version of an antique mistake.245

My aim is to encourage human rights advocates to imagine a
world in which the culture of impunity is not their principal opponent. As with relativism in 1984, few would actually argue for impunity today, such that anti-impunity often “concoct[s] the anxiety it
lives from.”246 In fact, as I have suggested above, anti-impunity is
more often than not today the battle cry of each side to any given
conflict. As such, it provides a way for all sides to avoid overt discussion of distribution, even while deploying in their political struggles
the criminal justice system, a potentially potent weapon of which the
human rights movement has long been critical.

244
Leora Bilsky describes, for example, how the release from legal liability provided by
a class action settlement encouraged the opening of corporate archives in Germany, enabling historians to research business cooperation with the Third Reich. Leora Bilsky, The
Judge and the Historian: Transnational Holocaust Litigation as a New Model, 24 HIST. & MEMORY
117, 136–38 (2012).
245
Clifford Geertz, Distinguished Lecture: Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
263, 263 (1984).
246
Id. at 265.
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